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Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan formed the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001.  The inclusion of India, Pakistan, and 
Iran in 2005 renewed speculation over a new “Great Game” in Central Asia.  While this 
notion is superficially attractive, this thesis delves deeper into what is driving Russian 
and Chinese interests in Central Asia, and thus, the SCO. 
The results are contradictory.  For Russia, participation in the SCO reflects an 
identity driven interest.  Russia views its membership in the SCO as the means by which 
it may regain super power status.  China’s participation in the SCO is driven by its energy 
concerns as a means to achieve long-term economic security. 
Though the American presence in Central Asia after September 11, 2001 has 
complicated both Russia’s and China’s pursuit of these interests, the SCO should not be 
viewed as a defensive alliance against the U.S.  Instead, the SCO resembles a 
dysfunctional international regime created in order to avert the threat of revolutionary 
upheaval in the Central Asian on the one hand and to pursue common interest in. long-

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii 




I. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN 
CENTRAL ASIA: A WHIFF OF A NEW “GREAT GAME”?..............................1 
II. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ........................................................................5 
A.  INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................5 
B. BALANCE OF THREAT – IS THE SCO AN ALLIANCE? ......................7 
C.  OMNIBALANCING – IS THE SCO A “CONCERT”? ..............................9 
D. INTERDEPENDENCE – IS THE SCO AN INTERNATIONAL 
REGIME?.......................................................................................................12 
E. DOES THE SCO REFLECT IDENTITY DRIVEN INTERESTS?.........17 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN...................................................................................18 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION .....................................................................................................21 
A.  INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................21 
1. The Shanghai-Five / Forum..............................................................21 
2. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Creation.....................23 
B. TIMELINE ANALYSIS OF THE SCO ......................................................28 
1. Shanghai-Five Analysis (1996-2000) ................................................29 
2. Shanghai Cooperation Organization Analysis (2001-2005) ...........31 
C.  OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION .........................................................................................36 
IV.  THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE TOWARD THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ......................................................................39 
A.  INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................39 
B. RUSSIAN IDENTITY DRIVEN INTEREST IN CENTRAL ASIA ........42 
1. Liberal Westernism, Pragmatic Nationalism and Fundamental 
Nationalism.........................................................................................43 
2. Russian Realism and Liberalism......................................................47 
3. Eurasianism........................................................................................50 
C.  RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INCENTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA.................54 
D. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AGENDA IN CENTRAL ASIA.........................59 
1. Limited Economic Sovereignty & Domestic Imperatives..............60 
2. Energy as a Strategic Instrument in Central Asia..........................62 
3. The Outlook: Does Russia view the SCO as an International 
Economic Regime?.............................................................................65 
E. RUSSIAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA ......................66 
1. Russian Reaction to Crises in the Former Soviet Union ................66 
2. Russian Efforts to Reestablish a Forward Security Zone in 
Central Asia........................................................................................69 
 viii 
3. The Outlook: Fading Hopes of being a Reliable Security 
Manager..............................................................................................71 
F. SUMMARY ANALYSIS ...............................................................................72 
V.  THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE TOWARD THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION ......................................................................77 
A.  INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................77 
B. CHINESE IDENTITY DRIVEN INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA......79 
C.  CHINESE STRATEGIC INCENTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA ................85 
1. China and the Strategic Scene in Central Asia pre 9/11 ................86 
2. Chinese Strategic Incentives in Central Asia post-9/11..................88 
3. The Outlook: Does China view the SCO as a Defensive 
Alliance? .............................................................................................89 
D. CHINESE ECONOMIC AGENDA IN CENTRAL ASIA.........................91 
1. Separatism and Economic Development in Xinjiang: The Door 
to Central Asia ...................................................................................92 
2. Economic and Energy Relations .......................................................94 
3. The Outlook: Does China view the SCO as an International 
Economic Regime?.............................................................................98 
E. CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA......................99 
1. Islamism and Separatism in Central Asia and Xinjiang ..............100 
2. The Outlook: is SCO the Key to Securing Xinjiang? ...................101 
F. ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE INTERESTS ............................................102 
VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE SCO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED 
STATES ....................................................................................................................107 
A.  NOT A NEW “GREAT GAME”................................................................107 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE 
SCO ...............................................................................................................108 
1. Anti-U.S. Alliance ............................................................................108 
2. SCO as a Reflection of Collective Identities..................................109 
3. The SCO as an International Regime ............................................109 
4. A Concert: Intervention in Central Asia .......................................111 
5. 2005 and Beyond ..............................................................................113 
C.  FUTURE U.S. AND THE SCO RELATIONS..........................................114 
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................117 








I would like to begin by expressing my deepest gratitude to my advisors Professor 
Anne Clunan and Professor Chris Twomey.  Professor Clunan’s commitment, patience 
and motivation are infectious, and I will always value her keen perceptions of Russian 
domestic and foreign policies.  Professor Clunan does not simply teach; she inspires.  I 
would also like to thank Professor Twomey for his never-ending support and sage advice 
on the complexities of Chinese foreign policy.  Additionally, I would like to extend my 
appreciation to Professor Mikhail Tsypkin and Professor Tom Johnson of the National 
Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Their interest and 
encouragement on this endeavor contributed enormously to my understanding of the 
regional dynamics of Central Asia as an area for continued study and research. 
Most of all, I would like to thank my wife Diedre and son Tyler for their gracious 
and kind support.  This thesis and my educational experience at the Naval Postgraduate 
School would not have been possible without their support and encouragement.  I am 




























I. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICT AND 
COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA: A WHIFF OF A NEW 
“GREAT GAME”? 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is developing into a major 
regional institution in the heart of Eurasia.  Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan formed this organization in 2001.  The 2005 inclusion of 
India, Pakistan and Iran in an “observer” status role increased speculation over the future 
implications of such a regional grouping, especially as a challenge to America’s position 
in the international system and the beginning of a new “Great Game.”1  Referring to the 
existence of Russian, Chinese and U.S. interests in Central Asia as a new “Great Game” 
rests on a simplified assumption that these actors are competitors in a global race for 
power.  To make any predictions about the SCO, one must look at the other factors 
shaping Russian and Chinese participation in this regional organization.  To avoid 
miscalculating how an organization such as the SCO will operate within the international 
system, one must examine factors contributing to Russian and Chinese foreign policy 
behaviors in Central Asia, such as identity driven interests, perceptions of threat, as well 
as security and economic motivations.  By disregarding these variables of analysis, one 
will fail to appreciate that Russia’s and China’s foreign policies are driven by domestic 
imperatives, rather than the power politics familiar from the Cold War paradigm. 
Many scholars have tried to characterize the SCO since its inception, but during 
the organization’s short history, it has largely remained an enigma.  Characterizations of 
the SCO range from a security organization to a regional economic forum, or as an anti-
terrorism coalition.  Another common portrayal of the SCO is as a Russian- and Chinese-
led alliance created to counter U.S. hegemony.  These attempts to classify the SCO raise 
several important questions about the Central Asian region.  What chance does the SCO 
have of becoming a viable organization?  Is the SCO just the latest in a long line of 
                                                 
1 For press coverage of this event see: Valery Agarkov and Oral Karpishev, “Russian Spokesman: 
India, Iran, Pakistan To Join SCO as Observers,” Moscow ITAR-TASS in English, 4 June 2005, FBIS 
Document ID: CEP20050604029012; “China Supports Pakistan, Iran, India Becoming SCO Observers,” 
Beijing Xinhua  in English, 7 June 2005, FBIS Document ID: CPP20050607000132; and “Transcript of 
PRC FM Spokesman News Conference on 7 June 05,” Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's 
Republic of China WWW-Text in Chinese, 7 June 2005, FBIS Document ID: CPP20050607000171. 
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organizations pretending to unify and integrate Central Asia?  Does the seductive 
presumption of a looming battle for control of Eurasia smell of a new “Great Game” and 
great power rivalry, which could lead to an anti-U.S. alliance?  Does the real significance 
of the SCO rest in a consensus among like-minded elites faced with another perceived 
threat?  Does active participation by Russia and China guarantee regional security and 
regime survival of the current political elites in Central Asia?  Finally, is there something 
unique about the SCO that reflects an attempt at resolving dilemmas of common interests, 
as well as seeking long-term cooperation on a number of key regional issues? 
Answering these questions requires knowing how its 2 key players, Russia and 
China, view the SCO.  In order to identify their primary motivations regarding the SCO, 
one must investigate how the two countries define their interests.  The current 
geopolitical and geoeconomic relations between Russia, China and the U.S., may 
constrain the definition of these interests, but they do not fully determine them.  The 
inquiry therefore centers on what Russia and China believe their individual interests in 
Central Asia are, before analyzing how they view the SCO.  In particular, one must 
consider how identity driven interests, perceptions of threat, and economic interests shape 
cooperation and create tensions.  How do the Russians and Chinese view Central Asia as 
a region and the SCO as an organization? 
The results of this thesis are contradictory.  Initially, both Russia and China 
sought to reduce tensions and hostilities prevalent during the Cold War era.  The SCO 
offered a cooperative solution for common dilemmas.  However, over time the SCO 
reflects something different for each country.  This thesis argues that post-Cold War 
internal and external events forced Russia to examine its national identity, which 
influenced its interests in the SCO.  The SCO supports the current Russian elite 
consensus of a Eurasian identity—an East-West bridge—and offers Russia the best 
chance of returning to the “status” of a great power.  The SCO provides the means (e.g. 
security and economic opportunities) to this end.  In contrast, the evidence shows that 
economic interests are driving China’s participation in the SCO.  For China, regional 
security is an important first step in achieving sustained economic growth.  China has 
used the SCO to enhance its regional influence and prestige by offering bilateral 
economic deals to the Central Asian republics at Russia’s expense.  The economic growth 
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of the Chinese interior is a vital step toward ensuring China’s sustained economic growth, 
access to vital resources necessary for long-term economic security, and thus, its national 
security. 
To reach these conclusions this thesis is organized into five sections.  First, it 
begins by reviewing the relevant international relations literature that might provide 
explanations for the existence of the SCO.  Second, it will examine the history of the 
SCO, from its beginnings as the Shanghai-Five to its modern-day form.  Third, it will 
explore how Russia views its Central Asian regional policies and bilateral relations with 
China and the Central Asian republics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 2  Fourth, it 
will explore why China pursued its Central Asian regional policies and bilateral relations 
with Russia and the Central Asian republics.  Finally, the thesis discusses the 
implications of Russia’s and China’s interest in the SCO for U.S. foreign policy in 
Central Asia. 
                                                 
2 For the purpose of this thesis, the usage of the term “Central Asia republics” or “Central Asian 
states” refers to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which are members of the SCO.  
Turkmenistan, under President Saparmurat Niyazov, has remained committed to its neutral stance and non-



























II. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What explains Russian and Chinese contemporary cooperation in Central Asia, 
and in particularly within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) framework?  
Specifically, what are Russia’s and China’s motivations for agreeing to engage in a 
mutually beneficial relationship with the Central Asian Republics?  In order to begin 
addressing these questions it is necessary to understand what the SCO is, as well as what 
theory accounts for the origins and sustainment of the organization.  In this endeavor, this 
chapter will identify several possible motivations underlying Russian and Chinese foreign 
policy interests in Central Asia, which in turn might best capture the creation and 
evolution of the SCO. 
At both scholarly and popular levels, one can find an abundance of explanations 
for the creation of the SCO.  Some have suggested that the SCO is a defensive alliance 
and is rooted in the realties of the post-Cold War international system.  According to this 
argument, Russia and China have sought to counter U.S. hegemonic actions and 
aggressive foreign policies. In particular, Russia and China perceive American 
interference in sovereign states, without the coordination of the United Nations’ (UN) 
Security Council, as a blatant disregard of international norms of behavior.  The critical 
events that perpetuate this negative reaction to U.S. foreign policies include NATO’s 
1998 Air War over Serbia and Kosovo, and NATO’s eastward expansion into Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as Central Asia.  Other events such as the U.S. withdrawal from 
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq 
would further bolster this argument.  If the SCO is an alliance and the balance of threat 
theory is operating, one would expect to see evidence of Russia and China continuing to 
view the U.S. as the threat.  One would also expect to see statements from Russian and 
Chinese elites identifying the U.S. as the chief threat. 
Those that speculate the SCO is a regional security architecture or a “concert” 
system postulate that the member states are interested in collaborating with each other to 
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maintain peace and stability preventing domestic political turmoil from terrorism or the 
prospects of more “colored” revolutions.  Key events supporting this argument would be 
sources of domestic or regional terrorism, separatism, extremism, and irredentism, or 
external events such as 9/11 and other worldwide sources of terrorism associated with 
radical Islamic fundamentalism.  If the SCO is a “concert” of Central Asia then one might 
expect to see the member states attempting to maintain the status quo by implementing 
“omnibalancing” policies necessary to ensure regime survivability against internal and 
external threats. 
Others point to the increased pressures of globalization and the impacts of the 
1998 Asian financial crisis as a primary driver in the development of the SCO.  Under 
these conditions, the SCO can be viewed as an international economic regime based on 
increased interdependence among the SCO members.  The SCO is a logical consequence 
of member states’ interest in reducing transaction costs, provide for regional development 
and prosperity.  If the SCO is an international economic regime, then one should see the 
members acting for the regional collective good and general welfare by foregoing short-
term gains.  One would also expect to see the SCO members seeking greater cooperation 
and collaboration for solving dilemmas of common interests.  In this scenario, Russia and 
China would restrain themselves from using compulsory strategies to limit the choices of 
the SCO’s weaker members. 
Others argue that changes in identity can be the basis for the articulation of new 
interests.  If true, then one should examine how interests form by considering how 
domestic and international events may have driven states to reexamine their identities.  
This approach would consider all the events previously mentioned as having an impact 
on how Russia and China view the SCO.  Finally, if the SCO were a sign of changes in 
Russian and Chinese identities and interests, then one would expect to see the SCO 
reflecting the codification of these interests in the development of a common working 
institution. 
In truth, a combination of the events cited above has caused Russia and China to 
reexamine their identities and interests in the post-Cold War environment.  Domestic and 
international events have, and are continuing to shape, Russia’s and China’s views of 
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what the SCO means to them.  The impact of these events has shaped how Russia and 
China designed their foreign policies, both regionally and internationally.  In Russia’s 
case, international and regional events have caused the political elite to reexamine the 
Russian identity.  The “Eurasian” identity now shapes how Russia sees its interests and 
outlines its foreign policy orientation with the ultimate goal of moving beyond its current 
status as a regional great power to once again being a superpower.  For China, 
international and regional events are also important, in shaping their regional identity, but 
it is their economic interests, which primarily drives its foreign policy in Central Asia.  
The next four sections will examine each of these theories in detail by examining their 
assumptions and predictions for the establishment and purpose of the SCO. 
B. BALANCE OF THREAT – IS THE SCO AN ALLIANCE? 
In order to determine if the SCO is an alliance, this thesis will analyze Russian 
and Chinese choices based upon Stephen A. Walt’s balance of threat theory.  Balance of 
threat is a revision of neorealist balance of power theory.  The balance of threat approach 
highlights that a state’s material factors and capabilities are still important, but must be 
weighted by perceptions of other states’ intentions.  According to Walt, conventional 
wisdom maintains that alliances form as a response to power, however he argues instead 
that states “ally with or against the most threatening power.”3  Walt considers four areas 
that might affect calculations of threat, and thus, alliance formation and partnership 
choices: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions. 
Aggregate power is based upon a state’s total resources that might produce either 
balancing or bandwagoning tendencies.4  States, according to Walt will also align in 
response to threats from proximate power.  Because the ability to project power declines 
with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away.  
Proximate power, like aggregate power, might also produce either balancing (i.e. 
alliances resembling checkerboards) or bandwagoning tendencies (i.e. “spheres of 
influence”).5  Additionally, “states with large offensive capabilities are more likely to 
                                                 
3 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (Spring 1985), 8-9. 
4 Ibid., 9-10. 
5 Ibid., 10-11. 
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provoke an alliance than those who are either militarily weak or capable of only 
defending.”6  Weak and vulnerable states may be forced to bandwagon because allies are 
not near and there is little hope of resistance.  However, states that have the means to 
resist will likely opt for alliances against states with greater offensive power.  Walt 
expects “great powers will balance more vigorously while weak states [will] seek 
protection by bandwagoning more frequently.”7  In this case, Walt predicts a world of 
tight alliances with few neutral states.8 
Walt’s most critical variable in determining how states form alliances is 
“offensive intentions.”9  For Walt, it is intentions rather than power which play the 
crucial role in determining the choice of allies and why particular coalitions form with 
particular partners.  According to Walt, “even states with rather modest capabilities may 
trigger a balancing response if they are perceived as especially aggressive.”10  Indeed, 
“the more aggressive or expansionist a state appears, the more likely it is to trigger an 
opposing coalition.”11  As to whether balancing or bandwagoning is the dominate 
tendency, Walt finds “[f]or states that matter, balancing is the rule: they will join forces 
against the threats posed by the power, proximity, offensive capabilities, and intentions of 
others.”12 
Based on the foregoing, if the balance of threat theory best describes Russia’s and 
China’s motivation for participating in the SCO, then the SCO would be a product of a 
perceived threat from U.S. hegemonic actions.  One would expect to see balancing and 
tighter coordination and cooperation between Russia and China in a defensive effort 
against U.S. actions and presence in Central Asia, and they would also perceive the U.S 
as threatening in its intent and capabilities.13  Thus, an imbalance of threat will cause an 
                                                 
6 Walt, 11. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.. 
9 Critical in the sense that is his amendment of Waltz.  
10 Walt 12. 
11 Ibid., 13. 
12 Ibid., 18. 
13 In addition, one would expect to see Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, if feeling 
threatened by U.S. foreign policy, to bandwagon with China and Russia against the U.S.   
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alliance response (e.g. SCO) against the most threatening state (e.g. U.S.).  Evidence of 
such threat perceptions are needed to support this argument and will be explored in the 
empirical chapters. 
This argument, although attractive, explains little about the creation of the SCO, 
but instead might offer insights into its continuation.  There is little question that the U.S. 
in the 1990s and today remains a global superpower.  However, after the events of 
September 11, 2001, Russia under President Vladimir Putin’s leadership, sought better 
relations with the U.S. based on a common perceived threat of radical Islamists and 
transnational terrorists.  Russia remained mute and on the sidelines while the U.S. 
established military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to launch military operations 
against the Taliban- led Afghan government and Al-Qaeda.  The Chinese reaction to 9/11 
was supportive of America’s right to respond against the sources of the attack in 
Afghanistan. 
Although Walt’s balance of threat theory contains important insights, it does not 
adequately explain how internal and external non-state actors affect perceptions of threats 
to the security of the state.  “Omnibalancing” may offer additional insights, especially 
within Central Asia. 
C. OMNIBALANCING – IS THE SCO A “CONCERT”? 
Another explanation for the SCO framework is rooted in security, not from other 
states, but rather from non-traditional threats such as terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism.  This explanation derives from the early stages of the SCO’s development in 
pursuit of countering the “Three Evils”—international terrorism, religious extremism, 
and separatism.  Alternatively, another source of threat may be emerging to support an 
omnibalancing explanation for the SCO’s necessity.  The SCO may indeed reflect the 
proverbial tip of the iceberg as a visible expression of conservatism in Central Asia.  The 
post-Soviet status quo has obviously began to strain under the pressures of “colored” 
revolutions, especially after the Georgian “Rose”, Ukrainian “Orange” and Kyrgyzstani 
“Tulip” revolutions.  As one analyst put it, “[t]he increased commitment to the SCO is a 
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natural reaction, a huddling of harried elites who have seen the waters around them rise 
and are intent, now more than ever, on not rocking the boat.”14  
These arguments might postulate that the SCO is a modern day “concert” of 
Central Asia created to preserve the status quo of the Soviet- legacy regimes.  This view is 
centered on a shared perception of threat to domestic security derived from the 
destabilizing forces or revolutionary ideas generated from within or from outside the 
region.  These threats could serve to strike at the foundations of the Central Asia regimes 
legitimacy.  This argument would indicate that the SCO countries’ ruling elite have a 
vested interest in maintaining that status quo and have a common perception of threat, 
whether internal or external, to the region. 
While Walt examines how states at the systemic level view other states as threats 
based on their aggregate power, proximity, offensive capabilities and offensive intentions 
when choosing their allies, Stephen R. David amends this view to also consider internal 
adversaries.15  David agrees with the central assumption of the balance of power—that 
threats will be resisted—but focuses on Third World state leaders’ need to counter all 
threats, whether from other states or domestic sources.  “Omnibalancing” combines 
levels of analysis—system-level structure with domestic politics—as a refinement of 
realist balance of power theory and of neorealism.  Specifically, David’s omnibalancing 
theory considers how internal and external threats to state leadership directly affect how 
states choose their partners.  Omnibalancing shares realism’s argument that “international 
politics focuses on power, interests, and rationality,” but “asserts that realism must be 
broadened to examine internal threats in addition to focusing on external threats and 
capabilities (that is, structural arguments), and that the leader of the state rather than the 
state itself should be used as the level of analysis.”16 
For David, “the most powerful determinant of Third World alignment behavior is 
the rational calculation of Third World leaders as to which outside power is most likely to 
                                                 
14 Kimmage, “Central Asia; SCO – Shoring Up the Post-Soviet Status Quo.” 
15 A key distinction between Walt and David is Walt expects small states to bandwagon with great 
powers, while David predicts small states to balance against threats. 
16 Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, 43 no. 2 (January 1991): 
236-237. 
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do what is necessary to keep them in power.”17  He offers three main points in 
readdressing neorealist balance of power theory.  “First, rather than just balance against 
threats or power, leaders of states will appease—that is, align with—secondary 
adversaries so that they can focus their resources on prime adversaries.”18  Second, in 
order to counter the more pressing and dangerous threats David contends that when states 
seek partners, they will appease secondary threats and focus their energies on their most 
dangerous domestic opponents. He offers that, while this might appear as states 
demonstrating bandwagoning behavior, they are actually balancing through modifications 
in their alignment positions so that they can conserve strength and focus against their 
primary threat.19  Finally, by engaging in such alignment strategies, Third World leaders’ 
primary motivation is regime survivability; and will seek to protect and defend 
themselves at the expense of the state.20 
In essence, David’s theory rests on the assumption that these leaders will do what 
they must for “political and physical survival,” by balancing between internal and 
external threats.  Central to his theory is the assumption that these “leaders are weak and 
illegitimate and that the stakes in domestic politics are very high.”21  David also suggests 
that in the Third World there is an interrelationship between internal and external threats.  
In particular, that regime leaders, as well as domestic “insurgents commonly seek outside 
support to advance their interests.”22 
For cases where the principle threat to the regime leadership is from other states, 
balance of threat theory indeed applies.  However, it is only prudent to consider whether 
and how internal threats play a prominent role.  Omnibalancing is especially insightful 
when, in determining the threat, states perceive the threat as being sponsored by an 
outside power, as well as how non-state actors and ideas might play a critical role in 
examining perceptions of threat.  A key consideration for neorealist balance of threat and 
                                                 
17 David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” 235. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 236. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 240. 
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omnibalancing theories is that “leaders prefer to align with states that ensure their hold on 
power rather than with states that may increase their power, but at the risk of endangering 
their survival.”23  There is a key distinction between these two neorealist theories for how 
states make alignment choices.  Leaders operating under a balance of threat system will 
ask, “What state has the greatest intention of threatening us?” Whereas “omnibalancing 
assumes the decision maker asks, ‘Which outside power is most likely to protect me from 
the internal and external threats (as well as combinations of both) that I face’?”24 
If the SCO reflects omnibalancing, then there should be evidence that the SCO 
either was created or is sustained for preventing weak state contraction.  The key area to 
analyze lies in how Russia and China have sought to maintain the status quo of regimes 
in Central Asia.  In this respect, one should look for examples of SCO members allying 
against domestic threats rather than external threats.  This explanation’s primary merit 
lies in identifying whether internal stability is the glue holding the SCO together that then 
enables analysts to access the durability of such a basis for cooperation. 
D. INTERDEPENDENCE – IS THE SCO AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME? 
Neoliberalism offers an alternative framework for addressing state behavior.  
Interdependence theories strive to explain cooperation among states.25  Interdependence 
means more collaborative action is needed for solving problems of common interests.  
Neoliberals emphasize that conditional cooperation can be achieved as states increase 
their interactions.  By pursuing multiple mutual interactions, states can reinforce 
cooperation as the best long-term strategy for reducing security competition. 26  This 
“conditional cooperation among states may evolve in the face of international anarchy 
and mixed interests through strategies of reciprocity, extended time horizons, and 
reduced verification and sanctioning costs.”27  Neoliberals argue that international  
 
                                                 
23 David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” 244. 
24 Ibid., 238. 
25 The seminal work remains Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977). 
26 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, David A. Baldwin, 
ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 122. 
27 Ibid. 
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regimes reduce the transaction costs associated with these interactions.  The suggestion is 
that a “[h]egemonic power may be necessary to establish cooperation among states … but 
it may endure after hegemony with the aid of institutions.”28 
Neoliberalism argues, “that growing economic interdependence, the diffusion of 
new technologies and ideas, and the awareness of common transnational problems 
diminish the importance of borders and create transnational actors and a demand for 
international cooperation.”29  Stated briefly, “states can no longer solve a number of 
issues through unilateral action alone.  Common problems demand a pooling of resources 
and even the creation of regimes to facilitate cooperation.”30  According to Paul Kubicek, 
this often “may occur regionally, since nations in the same region may share a variety of 
concerns, possess similar cultures and social structures, and have greater contact with 
each other.”31 
Regimes, unlike alliances, “must be understood as something more then 
temporary arrangements that change with every shift in power or interests.”32  
International regimes are “defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, 
and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
issue area of international relations.”33  Furthermore, “regime-governed behavior must 
not be based solely on short-term interests.”34  International regimes help reduce the costs 
and increase the benefits of collective action by fostering a sense of general obligation in 
which reciprocity is emphasized.  Under these conditions, states “will sacrifice short-term 
calculations of interests with the expectation that other actors will reciprocate in the 
                                                 
28 Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal 
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29 Paul Kubicek, “Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies 49, 
no. 4 (June 1997): 639. Paul J. Kubicek is an Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations at 
Koc University, Istanbul Turkey 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Stephen D Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” International Organization 36, no. 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982): 186.  Stephen D. 
Krasner is Professor of political Science at Stanford University 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 187. 
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future, even if they are not under a specific obligation to do so.”35  Stephen D. Krasner 
postulates that “[i]t is the infusion of behavior with principles and norms that 
distinguishes regime-governed activity in the international system from more 
conventional activity, guided exclusively by narrow calculations of interests.”36 
Regimes are not an ends unto themselves, but can affect outcomes and behavior, 
driven by power and interests.37  Regimes make international competition less violent 
and insecure, and cooperation more beneficial, as well as they may change states’ 
perceptions of their interests.  In the international system, “the basic function of regimes 
is to coordinate state behavior to achieve desired outcomes in particular issue-areas.”38  
Nevertheless, the question remains as to the stability of a regime when actor preferences 
change.  Susan Strange contends “All those international arrangements dignified by the 
label regime are only too easily upset when either the balancing of bargaining power or 
the perception of national interest (or both together) change among those states who 
negotiate them.”39  Thus, if short-term narrowly defined security issues can take a back 
seat to shared long-term aspirations of economic development, then the SCO might be 
characterized as an international regime and not a temporary alliance. 
Krasner considers five causal variables for regime development: egoistic self-
interest, political power, norms and principles, habit and custom, and knowledge.  This 
analysis will strictly focus on the two most prominent explanations for regime 
development: egoistic self- interest and political power.  Here Krasner seeks to answer 
two questions. First, “[w]hat is the relationship between basic causal factors and 
regimes?”40, and second, “[w]hat are the conditions that lead to regime creation, 
persistence, and dissipation?”41 
                                                 
35 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” 187. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 191. 
39 Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis ,”International Organization 
36, no. 2, International Regimes (Spring, 1982): 487.  Strange is presenting a realist critique of regime 
theory here, not what regime theorists argue.  Regime theorists counter that transaction costs and reduced 
uncertainty lead states to maintain regimes even when the distribution of power shifts. 
40 Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” 195. 
41 Ibid. 
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Egoistic self- interest is the prevailing explanation behind the creation of 
international regimes.  This implies a Hobbesian world, where self- interests matter most 
and revolves around economic considerations.  Here a state’s only consideration is its 
“desire to maximize one’s own utility function where that function does not include the 
utility of another party.”42  From this interest-oriented perspective, actors can either be 
constrained or unconstrained by the regime.  Dilemmas of common interests can be 
resolved through collaboration by creating regimes, which constrain states and will guide 
decision-making.  Dilemma of common aversions can be resolved through policy 
coordination, which does not require a regime to be formalized or institutionalized. 
Arthur Stein is interested in the likelihood of cooperation in anarchy and the role 
of international institutions or regimes in facilitating cooperation.  Stein believes that 
regimes are created in the international arena to curb individualistic behavior.  Stein 
claims “[r]egimes arise because actors forgo independent decision making in order to 
deal with the dilemmas of common interests and common aversions.”43  The difference is 
that in dilemmas of common interests, actors share a common interest in ensuring a 
particular outcome, where in dilemmas of common aversion situations, actors have a 
common interest in avoiding a particular outcome.  Each dilemma produces very 
different types of regimes.  Dilemmas of common interest regimes are based on 
collaboration, where dilemmas of common aversion regimes require coordination.  
Regimes of collaboration that are “intended to deal with dilemma of common interests 
must specify strict patterns of behavior and ensure that no one cheats.”44  Collaboration 
requires a degree of formalization with a clear distinction between what is considered 
cooperation and cheating.  These regimes also require that each actor must be assured of 
their own ability to immediately spot others cheating.  By contrast, regimes established 
for dilemmas of common aversion need only facilitate coordination and ensure particular 
outcomes are avoided.45  Here a regime created to deal with common aversion issues 
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supports the explanatory framework of the SCO as a “concert”—created and maintained 
to ensure the status quo of the existing political order in Central Asia by averting 
possibilities of regime change. For the purpose of this thesis, the empirical chapters will 
only examine the cooperative efforts of Russia and China in considering if the SCO is an 
international regime created and sustained for solving long-term common interest issues. 
Political power is the second major casual variable for explaining regime 
development.  Political power as a variable has two different orientations.  The 
cosmopolitan approach promotes maximizing joint gains for the common good (e.g. 
collective goods such as defense, the maintenance of order, and general welfare).  
However, this altruistic approach is limited because even if states see a collective good, 
they will only cooperate if it is in their interests.  The alternative power orientation is in 
the service of particular interest where “[p]ower is used to enhance the values of specific 
actors within the system.”46  In these cases, the incentives to create regimes may be to 
protect the distribution of power or they might be associated with powerful states’ 
attempts to use compulsory strategies to limit the autonomous choices of weak states.  In 
the latter case, “dominant actors may secure de facto compliance by manipulating 
opportunities sets so that weaker actors are compelled to behave in a desired way.”47 
If the SCO reflects neoliberal institutional regime theory, then there should be 
evidence that the SCO was created and maintained to promote cooperation and reduce 
dilemmas of common interest.  The key area to analyze rests in how Russia and China 
view the SCO.  Specifically, was it created and maintained to improve collaborative 
efforts by reducing uncertainty, monitoring behavior, and increasing information sharing 
in long-term common issue areas? One should look for examples of Russia and China 
promoting the collective good regionally over using their positions of strength to advance 
their own interests at the expense of the smaller Central Asian republics.  In this vein, one 
must consider how Russia and China view the importance of the SCO’s multilateral 
framework over bilateral state-to-state relations among SCO member states. 
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E. DOES THE SCO REFLECT IDENTITY DRIVEN INTERESTS? 
Both neorealism and neoliberalism offer possible explanations for what the SCO 
is (e.g. alliance, concert, or regime) and what its agenda might entail.  These theoretical 
approaches offer a snapshot of the SCO in time, but do not reflect the underpinning 
interests behind Russian and Chinese motivations. While these theories are strong in their 
approaches to security and economic issues, they make assumptions of how each member 
state might view the SCO, while failing to address the sources of these interests.  It is 
problematic to assume what the interests are and additional analysis is required to 
develop a solid foundation of how these interests were formed.  An alternative theory, 
social constructivism, offers a compelling case by examining the sources of state 
interests. 
Social constructivism provides insights into how a state’s identity might shape its 
interests, especially in relation to external and internal events which seem to induce 
responses from the SCO in its joint communiqués. When examining the balance between 
security and economic issues, perceptions of interests get at the larger question of how 
states will behave—specifically, how Russia and China are pursuing their interests in the 
SCO.  This section looks at a constructivist approach for understanding state interests and 
state behavior by investigating Russian and Chinese motives for creating and sustaining 
the SCO. 
Social constructivism shares an interest in how norms, culture, and debates about 
identity, influence and shape the international system.  Using this approach provides an 
avenue “to specify the interests of actors, the sources of these interests, and how those 
interests change.”48  Much constructivist inquiry looks for examples of states evolving 
from individualist identities of “every state for itself,” to a collectivist identity, in which 
countries identify their security in a greater collective whole.  In this view: 
states form their security identity through a process of reiterated 
interaction with other states … a long process of friendly interaction may 
lead states to not only identity each other as allies and friends, but to view 
                                                 
48 Anne L. Clunan, “Constructing Concepts of Identity,” in Beyond Boundaries? Disciplines, 
Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies, eds. Rudra Siland and Eileen M. Doherty 
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their security interests as intertwined and consequently to identify with 
each other as belonging to the same community. 49 
While this explanation is less parsimonious then those previously addressed, it 
does add value in the conceptualization of identity, comprising of both international and 
domestic factors.  Stated briefly, a state’s identity and interests form based on how 
significant events affect its perceptions of self and are a prescription for its policy 
orientations.  Constructivist explanations may in fact provide a complete picture of how 
Russian and Chinese identities and interests have influenced the creation and continuing 
evolution of the SCO, reflect shifts in interests and how cooperation in security and 
economic spheres has grown to accommodate these interests. 
The SCO might reflect an emerging collective consciousness of certain common 
interests and values, by which bind Russia, China, and the Central Asian republics by a 
commonly accepted set of rules in their relations with one another.  The SCO might 
reflect a codification of these interests with the production of a common working 
institution.  In this case, international and domestic politics can play a large role in 
defining national goals and interests.  In examining this theoretical approach, the analysis 
will look for evidence of Russian and Chinese identities evolving in the post-Cold War 
environment.  An important factor is an evaluation of how both internal and domestic 
events play a role in developing new identities.  Do the Russians and Chinese recognize 
that new tasks and challenges are at hand, and thus, the need for creating a new 
bureaucracy for carrying out these tasks? 
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The next three chapters will examine the empirical evidence supporting the 
notions that the SCO either is an alliance, a concert, an international regime or identity 
driven.  If balance of threat applies to the SCO, then the evidence will show that the SCO 
is an ad hoc, temporary alliance built to defend against an external threat.  If 
omnibalancing explains the SCO, then it reflects an ad hoc, temporary concert generated 
for countering both external and internal threats, as well as preserving the status quo in 
Central Asia.  If interdependence applies, then the SCO can be described as an 
international regime formed to address common interest issues through cooperation and 
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collaboration in the long-term.  There will be evidence of states wanting a regime 
because they are interested in reducing transaction costs and uncertainty, as well as 
increasing information flows.  However, if social constructivism is the most relevant 
approach, then the previous assumptions are inadequate and one must inquire into how 
changes in identity are reflected in interest formation to understand what are Russia’s and 
China’s motivations. 
These distinctions are necessary for conducting a comprehensive analysis which 
is attentive to short- versus long-term gains, perceptions of threat, and whether power, 
security, and economics are a vehicle or a desired result.  In this endeavor, the Russian 
and Chinese chapters are laid out as follows.  The first section of each chapter will begin 
with an examination of how interests may have been influenced or shaped by key 
regional and international events since the end of the Cold War, to determine if questions 
of identity shaped interest toward Central Asia and how each country views the SCO.  
The second section will consider a country’s view of its strategic interests and political 
motives in Central Asia to determine if the views of the SCO and its members support the 
argument that the SCO is a defensive alliance agains t the U.S.  The third section will look 
for evidence of interdependence—especially in economic issues—and international 
regime formation/maintenance whereby each country has developed a set of common 
interests, and seeks to achieve long-term gains through cooperation in Central Asia.  The 
fourth section will investigate evidence of coordination activities and common 
perceptions of threat to the status quo to address whether or not Russia and China view 
the SCO as a modern day concert of Central Asia.  However, before advancing into the 
empirical chapters, the next chapter will present a brief history and cursory analysis of 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
21 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Shanghai-Five and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be 
seen as a logical follow up to the 1990 agreement between the former Soviet Union and 
China.  Their goal was to ensure good neighborly ties, as well as reducing the number of 
armed forces in the border regions of Central Asia.  The independence of the Central 
Asian republics in 1991 brought new sovereign nations into the regional discussions. The 
original 1996 Shanghai Agreement developed from two delegations; one group led by 
Russia representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while the other 
group was led by China.50 
1. The Shanghai-Five / Forum 
A 1996 meeting in Shanghai and a 1997 meeting in Moscow laid the foundation 
of the modern SCO.  Originally, the Shanghai Forum was formed to address a number of 
regional issues in Central Asia.51  First, the Shanghai Forum’s declared purpose was a 
commitment to fostering friendly relations and cooperation between its member states.  
Second, they wanted to promote mutual military trust between their countries.  Finally, 
they wanted to reduce the number of armaments along the borders of their countries 
making it a 1000-km demilitarized zone. 
The 1998 meeting of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan marked a dramatic departure from previous conferences where 
things were said, but never done. The vision for the meeting was to lay the foundation of 
turning “the border between the five countries into a frontier of genuinely equitable and 
mutually advantageous cooperation.”52  Prior to the meeting, one observer noted that the 
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five countries would come out of the meeting as independent partners in a negotiated 
alliance.53  The meeting of the Group of Five was attended by the president of each 
country, with the exception of Russia, which was represented by Foreign Minister 
Primakov instead of President Yeltsin.  The primary purpose of the meeting was to 
solidify the joint statements of the 1996 and 1997 meetings, including resolving Cold 
War border security issues and to make the organization “weightier and more solid.”54  
During the Cold War, Central Asia held a great concentration of opposing Soviet and 
Chinese forces.  “However, in the new conditions the countries of the region have 
resolved to turn what was once the major zone of tension into a zone of security.”55 
The five countries also took a “principled position on the nuclear tests carried out 
by India and Pakistan.”56  This unanimity demonstrated the SCO’s concern over issues, 
which could lead to regional instability and “reflects their confidence and determination 
in nuclear non-proliferation and prevention of nuclear tests.”57  In addition, the Chinese 
took the opportunity at this gathering to meet separately with Kazakhstan to resolve 
border dispute issues between their countries. 
The 1999 Shanghai-Five meeting in Bishkek was significant in that the members 
began to talk about reviving the “silk road” economy.  The new “silk road” involved the 
economic integration of Russia, China and the Central Asian republics through trade and 
investment, especially in the oil and gas sectors.  China was already busy mapping out its 
plans for the SCO prior to September 11, 2001.  Chinese President Jiang Zemin called on 
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down on the forces of religious extremism and ethnic separatism, as well as combating 
international terrorist activities.”58  Additionally, the conference joint communiqué urged 
members to develop further cooperation between ministries of defense and interior.59 
The 2000 meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan marked the first Shanghai Forum 
reaction to U.S. foreign policy.  The NATO war in Yugoslavia was conducted without 
UN Security Council approval.  China and Russia used the joint communiqué to state the 
importance of maintaining UN authority, particularly that of the Security Council. It also 
called “for a more effective role for the UN in conflict resolution … and condemned the 
use of human rights for undermining the national sovereignty of states.”60  Furthermore, 
the joint communiqué called for the establishment of a counter-terrorism center in 
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan “to jointly combat national separatism, international terrorism, and 
religious extremism,” as well as preventing trans-border activities.61  The anti-terrorism 
center was planned to “serve as the legal basis to start substantial cooperation in security 
issues and offer a more effective means for the fledging organization to combat terrorism 
together.”62 Additionally, Uzbekistan attended this conference as an observer and applied 
for full SCO membership. 
2. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Creation 
The sixth meeting of the Shanghai-Five in 2001 was preceded by several key 
meetings attended by the members’ general staffs and foreign ministers.  The grouping of 
five members was gaining its legs as a regional forum and organization.  When 
Uzbekistan became a full member, the group became known as the “Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization.”  This face-lift was ushered in by a series of policy decisions 
and conventions such as a communiqué on arms control reaffirming the SCO’s support 
for the 1972 ABM treaty and opposition to the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) 
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program, as well as declaring Central Asia a nuclear free zone.63  The attendees also 
came out in support of the UN charter and pledged noninterference in each other’s 
internal affairs.64  The SCO also indicated that they wanted to expand regional 
cooperation and initiated a dialogue with the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) regional forum.  The heads of state also agreed to speed up institutionalization 
of cooperation mechanisms in areas of border security, confidence building, anti-terrorist, 
separatist and extremist activities, economic cooperation, and social/cultural exchanges.  
Moreover, they also wanted to establish a apparatus for dispute resolution among SCO 
partners.65  The main output of this conference was the “The Shanghai Convention on 
Fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism.”  The Convention’s twenty-one articles 
continued to focus the SCO on regional security issues, while downplaying any notion of 
the SCO as a military alliance.66  According to Georgiy Bovt, at the SCO’s initial 
formation, its members considered “the Afghan regime their main adversary and planter 
of terrorism and narcotics.”67 
The first three years of the SCO’s agenda had been primarily driven by security 
concerns, including the reduction of state tensions over border disputes and by providing 
for stability in the highly ethnically fragmented Central Asian region.  Economic 
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coordination had not developed beyond existing bilateral ties.  Economic cooperation 
took a backseat to security concerns and occupied “a strictly marginal position in the 
work of the youthful forum.”68 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the SCO began to evolve more 
rapidly.  The U.S.- led Operation Enduring Freedom brought U.S. forces to Central Asia.  
While the Chinese and Russians recognized America’s right to respond to the sources 
responsible for the terrorist attacks, the establishment of U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan, a 
newly added member of the SCO, and Kyrgyzstan raised concerns within some military 
circles in Russia.  The SCO hastily pushed forward the establishment of a planned anti-
terrorism center.  In June 2002, the SCO signed the “Agreement between the member 
states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Regional Anti-terrorist structure.”  
This agreement was significant as it called for a clear-cut legal framework “for the 
establishment at the regional level of practical interaction in the struggle against 
terrorism, separatism and extremism.”69  In addition, the SCO regional anti-terror center 
was renamed the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). 
At the May 2003 meeting in Moscow, the leaders reached a consensus on the 
architecture of the future institutional organization of the SCO.  The most significant 
actions taken by the SCO heads of state was establishing an office of the SCO secretariat, 
which would be situated in Beijing, as well as the decision to launch a regional anti-







                                                 
68 Bovt, “Hexagon against Triangle,” FBIS Document ID: CEP20010618000244. 
69 Declaration by the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 7 June 
2002, from the Daily News Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
Information and Press Department.  
70 Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China, “Third SCO Submit Meeting Held 
in Moscow,” 29 May 2003. Available from The School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies 
<http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/fp/russia/20030529_sco_c_1.html> (accessed 23 May 2005.) 
26 
Executive Committee of the SCO regional anti-terror center from Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan to 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 71  The SCO also conducted its first joint exercise during August 
7–12, 2003.72 
Shortly after the meeting in Moscow, the SCO held a follow up economic 
cooperation and integration ministerial meeting in Beijing.  The Prime Ministers settled 
on a budget for the organization’s secretariat and the Tashkent anti-terrorism center. The 
officials codified six additional documents toward the institutionalization of the SCO.  
The documents solidified multilateral economic and trade cooperation, the 2004 SCO 
budget, and the “rules and regulations on salary and allowances for staff members of the 
permanent [SCO] body.”73  In addition, other documents covered the “anti-terrorism 
institution and personnel arrangement, technical initiation of the SCO permanent body, 
and a joint communiqué of the consultation.”74  An outside observer noted, “[W]ith the 
institutional arrangements and administrative functions taking shape, the group should be 
able to deal with events and threats it had previously been criticized as incapable of 
handling.”75 
With its institutional mechanisms in place, the SCO was ready to coordinate its 
activities with the Asian-Pacific region.  The June 2004 meeting in Tashkent further 
solidified the SCO’s framework, including approving Mongolia as a SCO observer.  In 
addition to discussing the security and stability in the region, including the remnants of 
the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamic extremist groups, Russia put forth an initiative 
to create a SCO-Afghanistan contact group to revive the Afghan economy.   The SCO 
members also signed an agreement outlining cooperation in the fight against illicit drug 
trading.  Russian President Putin “emphasized the importance of the SCO countries’ 
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participation in the implementation of the initiative to create external anti-drug security 
belts around Afghanistan.”76  The heads of state also agreed to set up a SCO regional 
development fund, as well as a plan to hold an economic forum. 77 
The July 2005 SCO summit meeting, held in Astana, Kazakhstan had planned to 
focus on the economy, but was overcome by domestic events in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan.  Russian Foreign Minster Sergei Lavrov indicated the SCO had plans to 
establish a comprehensive regional development fund and business council at the next 
summit meeting.78  Lavrov indicated that the 2005 meeting may go a long way toward 
solving regional problems: “Last year’s security and stability initiatives are being 
implemented, and contacts are being established with other organizations.”79  He further 
remarked that the “documents on cooperation with ASEAN and the CIS are being 
drafted, and the SCO has received an official observer status at the UN General 
Assembly.  This creates new possibilities for the solution of regional problems.”80 
However, the meeting was preceded by two events that gave rise to new fears 
among the SCO member states.  First, in March 2005, “a suddenly restive Kyrgyz street 
brought down long-ruling President Askar Akayev, prompting parallels with earlier 
changes in Georgia and Ukraine.”81  Later in May 2005, Uzbek police and military units 
used deadly “force to put down an uprising in Andijon, outraging public opinion in the 
West even as Russia and China chimed in with warm words of support for Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov.”82 
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The 2005 summit produced one highly publicized communiqué “rife with great-
power ramifications.”83  This SCO communiqué virtually called for the U.S. to establish 
a timetable for the removal of its forces from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 84  The SCO 
based its justification on the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition’s completion of the active 
military phase of operations in Afghanistan. 
B. TIMELINE ANALYSIS OF THE SCO 
The SCO has led to an impressive level of cooperation between Russia and China 
in Central Asia.  The SCO offers Russia and China a mutually beneficial partnership.  
Thus far, the SCO has reduced military forces along the Russian and Chinese borders, 
established a coordinative security arrangement for managing traditional and non-
traditional security crises, and established a forum for economic development in the 
Central Asian region.  In short, the SCO provides a forum for Russia and China to 
manage their security, stability, and economic development interests in Central Asia.  
Nevertheless, what does this unprecedented level of cooperation tell U.S. policy makers 
about the SCO? 
This section provides a general timeline analysis of the Shanghai-Five and the 
SCO to see if the theories discussed in the previous chapter can help explain whether it is 
an alliance, a “concert”, an international regime or if there has been a change in identities 
which shaped the member states’ interest in the SCO.  While helpful, these initial 
conclusions are insufficient to explain what is driving Russian and Chinese interests in 
the SCO or how it may affect U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia.  The next two chapters 
further explore Russia’s and China’s interests in Central Asia to provide a more thorough 
framework for drawing conclusions that are more definitive on the implications of the 
SCO.  These results are more explicitly examined in Chapter VI after taking into account 
Russian and Chinese strategic incentives, economic agendas, and security interests in 
Central Asia. 
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1. Shanghai-Five Analysis (1996-2000) 
The original outcome of the 1996 and 1997 SCO meetings was an agreement for 
fostering good neighborly ties and reducing tensions by establishing a framework for 
demilitarizing the member states’ borders.  These issues remain valid today as an 
example of long-term cooperation in a common interest item, but at this early stage it 
would be too soon to characterize the Shanghai Forum as an international regime.  The 
actions of the members cannot support the other potential arguments of the SCO being an 
alliance or a concert. 
In 1998 the SCO sought to formulize a demilitarized zone in the shared border 
areas.  Kuanysh Sultanov, ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the People’s 
Republic of China clearly identified the reasons behind the Almaty summit:  
A summit of the heads of bordering states absolutely does not mean 
uniting in some sort of bloc, nor is it designed as a counterbalance against 
anybody. They come together out of common interest in the fields of 
peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation. 85 
The Shanghai Forum members also took a principled position on regional nuclear non-
proliferation to ensure that Central Asia remained a nuclear-free zone.  This can be 
categorized as another long-term common interest issue.  During this meeting, China 
began working to establish bilateral relations with the newly independent republics.  This 
was especially true with Kazakhstan, which one might explain as a self- interest item for 
economic access to energy resources. 
Despite the successes of the conference, Moscow may have started to lose 
influence over Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan early in the Shanghai 
Forum meetings.  It was unclear as to why President Boris Yeltsin did not attend the 
conference.  Several theories are that he did not attend due to a dispute with Kazakhstan’s 
President Nazarbayev over the allocation of Caspian Sea resources or more logically due 
to internal Russian political tensions.  Regardless, Beijing’s reaction was not positive.86  
This poses several interesting questions: What affect, if any, did Yeltsin’s absence play in 
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the initial stages of the SCO’s development?  Did Yeltsin’s administration view the 
Shanghai Forum as just another bi- or multi- lateral agreement that complimented other 
arrangements with its former Soviet Union states?  Or did the lack of Russian leadership 
from the outset or the inept Yeltsin regime allow China to begin to dominate the future 
SCO agenda from the start? 
The 1999 meeting focused its efforts on long-term economic cooperation with 
talk of the revival of the “silk” road.  However, the Chinese took the lead on proposing 
cooperation against regional threats to the member states.  Later, during the summer 
(July-August) of 1999, several hundred Islamic extremists invaded southern Kyrgyzstan 
from Afghanistan, in an attempt to establish bases of operations for launching attacks into 
Uzbekistan.  These forces were eventually driven out by October of that same year, only 
to reappear in August 2000.  The impact of an invasion by forces tied to the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, forced all member states to consider a new threat to the 
regional status quo.  The reactions of the SCO members’ seem to support the 
omnibalancing approach against internal enemies of the state and balance of threat 
against external foes. 
The first reactions to U.S. foreign policy occurred in 2000.  Russia and China 
could not stop NATO’s air war over Serbia and Kosovo and were irate at the seemingly 
revisionist nature of U.S. foreign policy.  NATO’s eastward expansion was also a great 
concern and was perceived as an American policy to encircle China and an attempt to 
further isolate Russia from its former Soviet republics.  Clearly, both the Russians and 
Chinese saw the U.S. as a threat and required them to come together to balance against 
the U.S.  However, their reactions to U.S. and NATO foreign policy did not necessarily 
paint the SCO as a defensive alliance against the U.S., because the priority threat lay 
elsewhere, especially for the post-communist transitioning Central Asian states.  The 
SCO’s move toward a cooperative security arrangement to counter terrorism, separatism 
and extremism indicates more of an omnibalancing approach by the Central Asian states 
in a concert to maintain the status quo.  However, this security arrangement also supports 




members to pool their security efforts and to codify the administrative mechanisms 
necessary for resolving dilemmas of common interest, which can be explained by 
international regime theory. 
2. Shanghai Cooperation Organization Analysis (2001-2005)  
In 2001, the SCO once again reacted negatively to U.S. foreign policy decisions 
to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty and the development of a national missile defense 
program.  This still does not support a military alliance assumption because the SCO 
members still viewed the primary threat as emanating from the Afghan Taliban- led 
government’s support for Islamic radicals operating in Central Asia, as well as narcotics 
trafficking.  The evidence shows that maintaining the status quo was at the top of the 
agenda.  The addition of Uzbekistan to the SCO’s membership ranks follows this line of 
reasoning.  The SCO’s actions in 2001 continued to demonstrate an interest in long-term 
cooperation by establishing a formalized bureaucracy to deal with dilemmas of common 
interest, both in the security and economic spheres.  This supports international regime 
theory.  However, security still dominated the agenda over economic coordination.  This 
can be attributed to existing Russian investments in the Central Asia’s energy resource 
firms and  control of the distribution infrastructure.  These factors mixed with Moscow’s 
attempts to use the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian 
Economic Community allowed it to maintain a soft hegemony and economic influence 
within the region at both bilateral and multilateral levels.87 
By the 2002 meeting, U.S.- led forces had removed the Taliban government in 
Afghanistan, thereby lessening the members identified source of threat from terrorism, 
separatism and extremism.  Nevertheless, the SCO pressed ahead with formalizing a legal 
framework for combating these sources of threat internal to the member states.  This 
clearly supports international regime theory but can also be seen as cooperation for 
maintaining the regional status quo.  This does not represent a short-term, ad hoc alliance 
dedicated to combating internal and external threats represented by omnibalancing.  
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The 2003 decision to create a SCO Secretariat further supports the international 
regime argument.  While both Russia and China have a huge stake in the future success 
of the SCO, the Chinese were clearly the big diplomatic winner.  The Chinese succeeded 
where the Russians had failed.  Chinese participation within the SCO offered the Central 
Asian states an alternative choice to other Russian attempts at multilateralism through the 
CIS.  Finalizing the “SCO Charter validates Beijing’s ‘new security concept’ of 
promoting multilateral approaches to regional security, as opposed to U.S.- led bilateral 
alliances or other security relationships.”88  Russia has also supported multilateral 
approaches including Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)-NATO parity in 
Central Asia, but has been more effective in promoting bilateral relations with its former 
republics.  This is especially true in military-to-military contacts.  Russia’s attempts to 
use its various post-communist multilateral frameworks have met resistance from the 
Central Asia states who have either participated minimally or opted out, such as 
Uzbekistan in the CSTO.  By taking this approach, the Central Asian states have loosened 
their ties with Moscow and have found themselves in a better situation to bargain state-
to-state, even if at a disadvantage in traditional power categories. 
The 2004 SCO heads of state meeting in Kyrgyzstan was expected to launch the 
foundation of future economic cooperation. 89  The agenda showed more signs of regime 
maintenance (e.g. multilateral economic and trade cooperation agreements, SCO budget, 
and rules and regulations for the secretariat).  Additionally, efforts to reach out to other 
regional countries and multilateral organizations are signs of increasing cooperation and 
promoting shared interests (e.g. countering narcotics trade and establishing a regional 
development fund).  The future of the SCO was pointing toward a mechanism to set up 
an economic alliance and free trade zone benefiting all its members.  China’s position of 
the SCO has remained consistent that “[t]he SCO will never grow into a military bloc nor 
resume military confrontation as in the Cold War.”90  These comments illustrate China’s 
desire to reduce direct military confrontation with the U.S. and  support the argument that 
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China’s economic security is the driving force behind its foreign policy in Central Asia 
and its interests in the SCO.  However, the events of 2005 have once again forced those 
studying the SCO and its members to reconsider if Chinese economic security or Russian 
prestige is on the line, and will the pursuit of these interests turn the SCO into a defensive 
alliance and a lever against U.S. foreign policy interests in Central Asia? 
The 2005 ouster of Kyrgyzstan President Akayev and  the international reaction to 
the Andijon uprising may have shifted the members of the SCO’s perception of threat.  
These two events, on the heels of other “colored” revolutions, began to shape how the 
SCO leaders identified threats to the regional status quo.  Namely, outside actors were 
involved in undermining regime stability.  Non-state actors were not the source of threat; 
instead, the threat emanated from other states interfering in the domestic affairs of 
sovereign countries.  This antirevolutionary fervor can be seen as a shared reaction to 
regime change.  Some SCO member states associate this new source of instability as a 
step-by-step attempt by U.S. foreign policy to advance democracy in the region; some 
seeing the U.S. as a revisionist power in Central Asia that was intent on destabilizing the 
fragile status quo. 
Moscow and Beijing had mixed initial reactions to the events in Kyrgyzstan. 91  In 
the aftermath of the regime change, the new Kyrgyzstan government agreed to continue 
with all of its SCO commitments and pledged to continue to work within the cooperative 
SCO framework.  Fears abated as both Russia and China accepted the new Kyrgyz 
leadership.  However, these events might have demonstrated the first evidence of a state’s 
willingness to pursue short-term gains, overriding its commitment toward long-term 
cooperation.  In the end, all sought the longer-term solution, but one might question how 
a similar scenario in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan would play out in terms of Russia or 
China pursuing their own self- interests.  The U.S. was not considered  
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or rhetorically mentioned as the primary threat after the events in Kyrgyzstan.  However, 
after the events in Andijon, Uzbekistan this conspiratorial notion of the U.S. being the 
main threat to regional stability became a new source of agitation and speculation. 92 
The SCO’s 2005 communiqué called for establishing a time table for the exit of 
anti-terrorism coalition forces from Central Asia.  This is the strongest evidence to date 
which might support the argument that the SCO is becoming a defensive alliance against 
the U.S.  The reason for this shift in rhetoric varied.  Some speculated that the SCO 
permanent members recognized, even in their own assessment, that the impact of their 
organization as a regional antiterrorist structure had marginal results to date, and that its 
influence over the security dynamics in Central Asia had been minimal due to the U.S. 
military presence.93 
Others have speculated that Uzbek President Karimov was behind the general 
push for the anti-U.S. declaration—specifically, as a singular response to U.S. criticism 
of the regime’s refusal to permit an international investigation into events in Andijon. 94  
Moscow has backed Tashkent during its latest downturn in relations with the U.S., but 
has also pursued its own interests by “incorporating in the declaration the paragraph 
about the timeframe for the US bases’ stay in Central Asia.  This can be seen as 
responding to Washington for the tough stance espoused by US-backed Georgia on the 
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withdrawal of Russian bases from its territory.”95  The Russians now seem to have 
distanced themselves from calling on the U.S. to establish a timetable for removing its 
troops from the Central Asian airbases. 
Russian President Putin commented that there was “nothing out of the ordinary” 
in the SCO seeking a requested timetable.  Further, he highlighted that the SCO, in 
pursuit of its anti-terrorism agenda, did not need to establish SCO military bases and that 
in practical terms Russia considered military issues to be a part of the CIS CSTO 
purview.96  Sergey Prokhodko, a Putin presidential aide, when asked if the subject of 
withdrawing U.S. forces had come up during the G-8 Summit in Scotland replied: “No. 
The question is of strictly applied nature.”97  Others suggest that this SCO proclamation 
is empty because, besides the rhetorical value, the U.S. seems to be the only country able 
to effectively maintain any semblance of stability in the region.  The basic problem for 
the Central Asian states is that they “are incapable of resolving their own geopolitical fate 
without the patronage--including military--of stronger powers.”98  Furthermore, Russia 
lacks the capability and resources necessary for assuming such a role, and is unwilling to 
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Other regional reactions were also mixed.  Tajik opposition leader Muhiddin 
“Kabiri said that the leaders of the SCO states considered the USA’s presence as one of 
the factors for ‘colour revolutions’ on post-Soviet territory.”100  The Kyrgyz foreign 
minister recognized the past benefits of a U.S. presence in the region.  However, she 
pointed out that the duration of the anti-terrorist coalition’s military bases in the SCO 
countries in Central Asia would be “directly connected with changes in the situation in 
Afghanistan.”101 
Several weeks after the summit, Tashkent called for the U.S. to remove its forces 
within 180 days, however Bishkek later seemed more apprehensive after a visit by U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and a sudden inflow of U.S. foreign aid.  After the 
terrorist bombings in London on July 7, 2005, the discussion of threats to regional 
stability turned away from the U.S. and again toward terrorism, separatism and 
extremism.  By mid-summer 2005, government leaders in Central Asia were focusing 
their efforts against an unsavory alliance of drug traffickers and radical Islamic agitators, 
as the primary threat, with some pointing to a revival of Hizb-ut-tahrir as the chief source 
of instability. 
C. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION 
The ebbs and flows of the SCO and its members’ perceptions of threat make an 
analysis of what it is, as an organization, problematic over its lifetime.  The lack of 
evidence of an alliance is deafening to those that espouse the SCO is the result of an anti-
American foreign policy sentiment.  The notion of a modern day “concert” of Central 
Asia and the omnibalancing approach has merit, but only to a point.  Yes, the Central 
Asian republics’ authoritarian regimes are interested in regime survival, which is strongly 
supported by Russian and Chinese interests in maintaining the status quo.  However, 
these are not short-term interests.  The SCO reflects more of an institutionalized  
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approach, not only in the security sphere, but also in economic cooperation needed for 
resolving dilemmas of common interest and promoting regional stability, security and 
development. 
International regime theory is very appealing based on the evidence reviewed.  
This theory would categorize the SCO as an institutionalized framework for solving 
dilemmas of common interests; although the importance of bilateral relations within the 
framework speaks toward states pursuing their self- interests.  Russia seems to act more 
short-term than the Chinese who have adopted more of a long-term orientation.  
However, none of these approaches thoroughly accounts for which Russian and Chinese 
interests are priori or why these interests were formed.  In order to resolve the impasse on 
this point the next two chapters will look at the constraints of the SCO on individual 
actors, as well as provide an analysis of what is driving Russian and Chinese interests and 
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IV. THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE TOWARD THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
What is driving Russia’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO)?  In order to understand Russian motivations behind their participation in the 
SCO, one must first consider the broader Russian elite views and policies toward Central 
Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  This chapter will focus on the internal 
Russian political debates over the post-Soviet Russian identity. It will also examine 
Russia’s strategic incentives, economic agenda and security concerns in Central Asia 
surrounding the initial establishment of the Shanghai-Five during the Yeltsin presidential 
administration to the SCO in its current form under President Putin.  Russia’s interest in 
the Shanghai-Five was driven by a desire to resolve long standing border disputes with 
China and the creation of a new strategic partnership.  Today, the SCO supports key 
Russian interests in Central Asia, including cooperation over anti-terrorism activities and 
the opening of new avenues for economic growth.  However, the SCO, which includes 
China, is only one of many primarily Russian- led multilateral organizations operating 
within Central Asia. 
During the Russian transition from the Soviet era, several regional and global 
events influenced Russia’s identity and foreign policy outlook.  These events include: the 
Tajik civil war; the 1994 rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan and their support for the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Uzbekistan; the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis; 
the 1999 Kosovo crisis paired with NATO’s eastward expansion; and the events of 
September 11, 2001, which renewed U.S. strategic engagement and interests in Central 
Asia.  These international and domestic events have shaped the way the Russian political 
elite view Central Asian regional developments in relation to global politics. 
Even though the multilateral cooperation achieved within the SCO has been 
notable, this chapter argues that Moscow’s choice to operate through bilateral sidebars 
within and multilaterally outside of the SCO framework, reveals its attachment to great 
power status and its competitive nature regarding its interests in Central Asia.  Russia’s 
40 
foreign policy can be seen as an attempt to “keep up with the Jones” in Central Asia, 
whether economically with China or as a reliable security manger through the CIS CSTO 
vis-à-vis the U.S. and NATO.  Russia’s near-term competition and cooperation is not a 
response against a particular threat, such as from another state or revolutionary 
transnational actor, but in fact is a response to the threat of continued loss of prestige.  
The Russian national identity and velikoderhavnost (commitment to great power status) 
does much to explain Russian foreign policy behavior in Central Asia.  Although 
geopolitics and geoeconomics have played a significant role in shaping Russia’s foreign 
policy orientation toward Central Asia, and more specifically its interests in the SCO, one 
might consider them constraining variables. 
Wanting to move beyond its current regional power status and limited economic 
sovereignty toward regained great power status, the Russian political elite have 
recognized that Russia must be a part of the global community and will avoid policies 
favoring isolation and disengagement from the West.  Corollary, if Russia aspires to 
return to a great power status, it must avoid being “beaten”. 102  Thus, Russia’s 
motivations toward the SCO can be viewed as only one of the latest vehicles available for 
offering a means to make the transition back to a great power possible.  In order to 
navigate this agenda, in the face of increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic pressures 
from both East and West, Russia has sought its own path by relying on the trappings of 
                                                 
102 The concept of being “beaten” is familiar outcome to be avoided based on Russia’s historical 
experience in how Russia has pursued its Eurasianist orientation.  Russia’s current policies should not be 
necessarily considered “pro” or “anti” any particular country, but in fact represents a “pro-Russian” policy 
and that Russia’s interest come first.  According to Stalin: “To slow down the tempo of industrialization 
means to fall behind. And those who fall behind are beaten. The history of old Russia consisted, among 
other things, of constantly being beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol Khans ... She 
was beaten by the Swedish feudals. She was beaten by the Polish-Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the 
Anglo-French capitalists. Everybody beat her--for backwardness ... If you are backward, if you are weak, 
you are in the wrong, you can be beaten and enslaved. If you are strong, then you are in the right, you must 
be treated with care ... We have fallen fifty to one hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must 
cross this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we will be crushed.”  Mis ha Tsypkin, “Preparing for 
World War II.” (Lecture at Navy Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, 19 April 2005) translated 
from I.V. Stalin, Sochineniya  (Moscow: Politizdat, 1951), vol. 13, pp. 38-39. 
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its unique identity.103  The following sections of this chapter outline the nature of events 
shaping the Russian “Eurasianist” foreign policy orientation, as well as the legitimacy of 
Russia’s search for its regional and geopolitical identity and interests, which is codified in 
the SCO. 
This chapter is organized into four sections.  The first section describes the 
evolution and growing consensus of Russian foreign policy decisions toward Central 
Asia in the Yeltsin and Putin administrations.  Those identified as Eurasianists or 
pragmatic nationalists appear to have won the current policy debate concerning Central 
Asia.  Thees diverse interests and policy prescriptions that emerged during the internal 
policy debate of the 1990s exemplifies Russia’s outlook regarding the SCO and its 
purpose.  The second section will lay the foundation of the Russian elites’ strategic 
incentives and political motivations in Central Asia in an effort to explore if the SCO is a 
defensive “alliance”.  The third section will examine the economic aspects of Russia’s 
policies toward Central Asia by examining the SCO as an international economic regime.  
In order to determine if this premise is applicable, it will consider how Russia’s use of 
bilateral and multilateral approaches, within and outside the SCO, contributed or 
hindered economic interdependence.  The fourth section will examine Russian security 
interests within the SCO framework.  Specifically, it will explore if the threat of the 
“Three Evils” of international terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as other non-
traditional threats such as narcotics trafficking and international crime, are the primary 
motivation for Russia’s participation in the SCO.  In this view, the SCO could be seen as 
a regional “collective security” arrangement or a modern “concert” of Central Asia used 
for maintaining the status quo of regional elites. 
                                                 
103 “‘Russia is a country which is still groping painfully for a national project and self-identification as 
a nation,’ said Masha Lipman, an analsyt [sic] at the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow. ‘If we compare 
Russia with other postcommunist [sic] countries, they opt for Europe as their future. Not Russia; Russia is 
very uncertain about what its future is about. Having gone astray on its way to find its own identity, it has 
naturally turned to the past rather than to the future, because the future is so uncertain and the present is so 
discouraging.’”  Robert Parsons, “Russia: Cossack Revival Gathers Momentum,” Radio Free Europe / 
Radio Liberty (5 May 2005) Available fromhttp://www.rferl.org/ accessed 5 May 2005. 
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B. RUSSIAN IDENTITY DRIVEN INTEREST IN CENTRAL ASIA 
The Russian elite view of the 1990s policy debate regarding Central Asia is the 
key to understanding how the Russian national identity is driving Russia’s interests for 
participating within the SCO architecture.  In general, there are three influential schools 
in describing Russia’s approach to Central Asia.  A “western school” believes the 
solution to post-communist problems is intimately linked with the West.  The “Asiatic” 
or “Oriental” approach suggests that Russia should recognize and reaffirm its historical 
roots in the Asiatic cultural and pursue closer relations with those nations surrounding 
Central Asia.  A third approach, “Eurasianism” blends the previously mentioned schools 
of thinking with special emphasis on Russia’s unique geopolitical, historical and cultural 
position as a “bridge” between Europe and Asia. 
Based on an analysis of identity driven interests, this section will lay out the 
groundwork for answering if Russia sees the SCO as a defensive alliance based on a 
perceived threat from U.S. hegemony and aggressive foreign policy.  The identity debate 
will also offer evidence for considering whether Russia’s economic agenda or regional 
security issues are the primary factors driving Russian interests in the SCO.  For an 
examination of possibilities, this section will recount the identity debates shaping Russian 
thinking about Central Asia in the post-Soviet era. 
In devising a national policy toward Central Asia, Russia has often blurred the 
distinction between foreign and domestic affairs.  Aspects of Russian and Soviet 
imperialism with their associated myths and persistent conditions are important in the 
search for a new Russian identity. 104  Specifically, those Russian elite which espouse the 
notion of Russia’s future destiny as a link between East and West rearticulate a position 
                                                 
104 For a detailed discussion of the three most important myths (search for warm water ports, oriental 
or Asian despotism, and the notion of Russian messianism) and persistent constraints (relative economic-
backwardness, permeable frontiers, a multicultural state and society, and cultural marginality) of historical 
Russian foreign policy see, Alfred J. Rieber, “Persistent factors in Russian foreign policy: an interpretive 
essay,” in Imperial Russian foreign policy, trans. and ed. Hugh Ragsdale (New York: Woodrow Wilson 
Center Press, 1993), 315-359.  For another discussion of Russian mythical beliefs and behaviors, see 
Edward L. Keenan, “On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviors,” in The International Politics of 
Eurasia Vol 1: The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. S. Frederick Starr 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), 19-39.  For a detailed review of Russia’s view toward 
Asia, specifically Petrine Russia and the emergence of the Eurasian concept in the twentieth century, see 
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Asia Through Russia Eyes," in Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of 
Russia on the Asia Peoples, ed. Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 
3-29. 
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familiar with Tsarist and Soviet leaders.105  The bottom line associated with Russian 
cultural arguments about national identity is its commitment to great power status.  The 
remainder of the identity section considers three approaches for Russian ident ity driven 
interests: pragmatic nationalism, debates between Russian schools of international 
relations theory and eurasianism. 
1. Liberal Westernism, Pragmatic Nationalism and Fundamental 
Nationalism 
Some analysts suggest the policy debates in the post-Soviet era have been a 
struggle between several rival camps (e.g. liberals, communists and moderates).106  
Central to this debate is the very identity of the new Russian state.  Nicole J. Jackson107 
identifies three rival camps from 1991 through 1996 on the eve of the first Shanghai 
Forum meeting, which served as the backdrop in understanding policy outcomes based 
on the conflicts raging throughout the Former Soviet Union (FSU) after the USSR’s 
breakup.  These general baskets of ideas included “liberal westernist”, “pragmatic 
nationalist” and “fundamental nationalist”, which competed for political dominance in 
the Russian policy debate.  Each of these political elite orientations suggested different 
policy options and recommendations for addressing Russia’s “near abroad” and crises 
that emerged during the 1990s in the FSU. 108 
                                                 
105 Alfred J. Rieber takes important notice of this particular myth and offers two examples. First, 
“Ivan IV’s dream of becoming the middleman between northern Europe and the East India trade by seizing 
the Volga basin” which never materialized. (Rieber, 325).  Second, Nikolai Bukharin, an early Soviet 
historian, highlighted this dilemma in a speech to the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923: “Soviet Russia lies 
geographically and politically between two giant worlds—the still strong and unfortunately capitalist-
imperialist world of the west and the colossal numbers of the populations of the east which is now in the 
process of growing revolutionary forces.  And the Soviet republic balances between these two enormous 
forces, which to a significant degree balances each other”  (Rieber, 354; Originally cited in E. H. Carr, The 
Bolshevik Revolution, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 3:231 n. 2, emphasis in Carr). 
106 For various attempts to categorize Russian Foreign policy schools, see: Vladmir Shlapentokh, 
“‘Old’, ‘New’, and ‘Post’ Liberal Attitudes Toward the West: From Love to Hate,” Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 199-216; Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking,” in Internal 
Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Neil Malcom and others, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
33-100; and Dmitri Trenin, The end of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and 
globalization, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001). 
107 Dr. Nicole J. Jackson is Lecturer in Security Studies in the Department of Politics and International 
Studies at the University of Warwick. 
108 See A. P. Tsygankov, “Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet 
Break-up,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36 (2003): 104. A. P. Tsygankov identifies at least 
four categories of conflicts, which emerged in the FSU. The first type of conflict concerns domestic ethnic-
based crises with international community visibility (e.g. Caucasus, Moldova, Tajikistan and Chechnya). 
The second category involves economic conflicts over Caspian Sea energy resources and competition 
among the newly independent energy dependent FSU ‘have not’ countries (e.g. Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and 
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According to A. P. Tsygankov, a Russian scholar in the U.S., the questions posed 
by the emergence of these conflicts were the following: 
If Russia is unable to perform its traditional stabilizing role in the region, 
who is going to play this vital role? How are analysts to respond to the 
sudden emergence of new threats when Russia itself is weak and has very 
limited resources at its disposal? Finally, what exactly is Russia with its 
new geographical boundaries and how should it reconstruct its traditional 
geopolitical identity?109 
For the Russian political elite, the emergence of these conflicts paired with the 
essential disappearance of what traditionally constituted Russia’s sense of geopolitical 
identity and symbols of national power meant a fundamental new challenge to the overall 
Russian geopolitical thinking and the Russian national identity.  Russian foreign policy 
orientations became associated with how the Russian elite viewed several categories of 
ideas.  These included questions such as: Should the identity of Russians be based on 
civic, linguistic or ethnic factors; what role does Russian history play; was the collapse of 
the USSR a positive or negative event; where Russia’s borders should  be drawn 
geographically; the worldview/self-perception of Russia’s international position; if 
Russian had a historic or geographic mission; and what system was best for Russian 
domestic politics and its economy.  The culmination of these ideas of identity then 
became the source from which to draw upon for prescribing Russian foreign policy 
orientations and its proposed policy guidelines. 
The liberal westernism approach proposed a civic Russian identity based on 
Russians living in Russia.  This approach saw little use for history and viewed the 
collapse of the USSR as a positive event.  It was satisfied with the borders of the Russian 
federation and saw Russia’s role in the international system as a peaceful “normal” 
                                                 
Tajikistan). The third category of conflicts was generated by domestic political arrangements.  These crises 
involved the former soviet republics’ legacy regimes that were unable to protect their citizens’ rights during 
their transition periods.  This mixed with the repression of their domestic liberal and religious opposition 
fostered a growing threat of regional instability and terrorism (e.g. Central Asia and Caucasus). The forth 
source of conflict derived from the instability of the new borders, especially on Russia’s southern tier.  The 
growing illegal immigration and narcotics trafficking (e.g. Sino-Russian and Tajik-Afghan borders) became 
an emerging threat. 
109 Tsygankov, “Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-
up,” 104. A. P. Tsygankov goes further to state that the magnitude and persistent presence of these 
questions has stimulated the rise of geopolitical thinking and geopolitical imagination in Russia over the 
decade following the Soviet disintegration. 
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power.  This approach favored Russia’s relation with the West and sought to imitate 
liberal democracy and market reforms.  It also rejected any Russian unique or historical 
mission.  The liberal westernism foreign policy orientation was directed toward the West 
with its main threat being a return of communism.  Because of its Western focus, 
relations with the FSU were not deemed significant, but did suggest that Russia’s 
relations with its former republics should be aimed at supporting their sovereignty, 
equality of the states on par with Russia, and concluded that Russia should avoid 
becoming entangled or interfering in their new independence.110 
Pragmatic nationalism favored a linguistic Russian identity and considered 
Russian-speakers within the FSU as Russians.  This approach did not view history as 
crucial, but rather as important with the collapse of the USSR as a negative event.  They 
identified Russia’s borders as the Russian Federation, as well as other parts of the FSU.  
This attitude took a balance of power worldview.  The elites, which took this view, saw 
Russia as a great power with its purview being the expanse of Eurasia and avowed Russia 
had a unique geopolitical mission within it.  Pragmatic nationalism also favored liberal 
democracy and market reforms, but emphasized that Russia’s own unique conditions 
must be taken into account.  Pragmatic nationalism prescribed that Russia should seek its 
own path in its foreign policy direction.  It saw its relations with the FSU as crucial, 
especially to protect Russian interests and supporting the rights of Russians in the near 
abroad during the post-Soviet transition period.  Its main source of threat derived from 
anything that might be considered as threatening Russia’s interests in the FSU, such as 
NATO’s eastward expansion or challenges to the Russian Diaspora living throughout the 
FSU.111 
Fundamental nationalism was anti-democratic, anti-marketization and blamed the 
West for the collapse of the USSR.  Its worldview judged the outside world as hostile 
with Russia surrounded by enemies.  Russia’s geography should be Eurasia, which 
included the Russian federation, as well as other parts of the FSU.  They identified either 
Russians as the union of ethnic Russians and Slavs in the FSU or ethnic Russians in the 
                                                 
110 Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003), 36-37. 
111 Ibid.. 
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Russian Federation or other parts of the FSU.  Fundamental nationalism also maintained 
Russia was still a great power and needed to maintain its empire associated with its 
historical and divine mission.  The two main sources of threat were from the West and a 
resurgence of pan-Turkism in the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Fundamental nationalism, 
like the pragmatic nationalism approach, also viewed the Russia Federation’s relations 
with the FSU as crucial; however, there was a contradiction in its foreign policy 
orientation.  On one hand, this approach sought an expansionist policy within the FSU to 
reincorporate certain parts of the FSU, but on the other, it sought an isolationistic foreign 
policy direction in international affairs.112 
Jackson finds that by 1996, the “pragmatic nationalism” camp weighed more 
significantly on “foreign policy choices through the domestic political process by 
creating road maps which reduced uncertainty and suggested specific policies, and by the 
institutionalization of the ideas into official policy concepts and doctrine.”113  Others 
argue Russia’s new identity driven interests were solidified after 1999, citing the 1998 
financial crisis or the 1999 NATO air war in Yugoslavia as the critical events shaping the 
Russian identity. 
During, the Yeltsin administration, the pro-westerners did not view NATO 
enlargement as a serious threat.  Instead, they criticized the Kremlin for its failure to 
convince the Central and Eastern European countries that Moscow no longer posed a 
threat to their security. 114 During this period, the first serious alternative to the pro-
western leanings of the early Yeltsin administration also emerged.  The “Eurasianist” 
concept espoused the view that Russia, in civilizational terms, had never been part of 
Europe.  Thus, it should choose a “third way” between the West and East.  Globally, 
Russia should be “the bridge” between these civilizations.115  Starting in 1994, these two 
paradigms of Russian post-communist foreign policy thinking gradually developed into a 
                                                 
112 Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions, 36-37. 
113 Ibid., 10. 
114 Alexander A. Sergounin, “Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Cross-Roads: 
Changing Paradigms,” Journal of International Relations and Development 3 no. 3 (September 2000). [e-
journal] <http:www.ciaonet.org/olj/jird/jird_sept00sea01.html> (accessed 20 April 2005).  Alexander A. 
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115 Ibid. 
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clear foreign policy orientation. 116  The impact of NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo 
crisis in 1999 only served as an additional dynamic in spurring the emergence of such a 
consensus.117  The Kosovo Crisis had a long-term impact on Russian foreign policy 
toward the West, drove Russia to embrace its new orientation and looked increasingly 
toward China for supporting its common interest issues.118  The emerging Russian 
foreign policy consensus based on tacit acceptance of Eurasianism, mixed with pragmatic 
nationalism, outlined how Russia should behave and participate in its foreign policy.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin eventually began to discuss Russia’s Eurasian identity 
in his foreign policy speeches.  Putin also began reengaging Russia’s traditional Asian 
partners, whose relations had languished during the initial post-communist transition 
period under Yeltsin’s flirtation with the West.  Putin soon launched into a series of 
presidential visits to China, India, Mongolia and North Korea in an effort to support this 
reorientation of Russian foreign policy. 
2. Russian Realism and Liberalism 
Others have identified a further breakdown of the policy debates based on 
divisions within the liberal and realist schools of Russian international relations 
scholarship.  Understanding Russian schools of realism is critical for analyzing 
perceptions of threat and alignment strategies regarding how Russians view NATO, the 
CIS CSTO and the SCO.  Many Russian realists, as well as liberals, view the 
international order as one which is currently unipolar in nature.  However, each views the 
                                                 
116 Sergounin, “Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Cross-Roads: Changing 
Paradigms.” Sergounin highlights contours of this consensus around several key points: Russia national 
interests came before any other considerations international social values and that its foreign policy should 
be subservient (as a means to an end) for Russia’s domestic needs; Russia should remain a great power 
with a strong voice in the international system; The Russian foreign policy elites tacitly accepted a 
moderate version of Eurasianism, in which Russia should cooperate with all countries in a even handed 
manner, neither favoring East or West; The Russian ‘near abroad’ should be at the top of Russia’s regional 
priorities that the Russia should be recognized as the unchallenged leader in the FSU based on its special 
geopolitical, strategic, economic, and humanitarian interests.  Finally, NATO’s eastward expansion had to 
be delayed if not halted by Russia strengthening its military ties with CIS states, China, and India while 
maintaining a limited security issue dialogue with NATO. Ibid. 
117 For an excellent analysis of Russia’s foreign policy prior to and after NATO’s 1999 Operation 
ALLIED FORCE and the formation of consensus, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The final triumph of the Pax 
American? Western intervention in Yu goslavia and Russia’s debate on the post-Cold War order,” 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001): 133-156. 
118 Such as supporting a multipolar world and toting increased importance of the United Nations for 
debating the legitimacy of military interventions, if not outright preventing military interventions without 
UN Security Council Resolutions which were seen as setting a dangerous precedent and a destabilizing 
force within the international system. Tsyganov, 153. 
48 
pillars of the world order differently.  The Russian liberals’ emphasize democratic 
institutions and norms 119 while Russian realists prefer power centers or poles.120  Liberal 
ideas dominated in the first half of the 1990s followed by the reemergence of realism in 
the second half of the 1990s.  Those that study this literature contend that since 1997, the 
idea of balance of power has returned in official Russian rhetoric and foreign policy 
discussions, which is prior to the Asian financial crisis and  NATO’s Operation Allied 
Force.  Increasingly, Russian foreign policy became defined in terms of supporting a 
multi-polar balance of power in the international system.121 
However, there is room for disagreement among Russian realists, especially in 
threat perceptions.  Some realists, as represented on the influential Council on Foreign 
and Defense Policy, favor concentrating on the CIS.  They recognize that while Russia 
remains in a weakened economic position, Russian foreign policy resources will be 
limited and that domestic imperatives should be the priority for solving a number of 
pressing internal problems over foreign policy initiatives.  Another group favors a 
“Russia–China axis against the U.S. and supports establishing deeper economic 
cooperation with other Asian countries in response to global challenges.  Others support 
alliances with Western countries, including relationships with both the U.S. and the EU, 
“but only on conditions acceptable to Russia.”122  These policy prescriptions are 
                                                 
119 The most mainstream group of Russian liberals is that of the so-called westerners, who 
acknowledge Russia’s dissimilarities with the West, but attribute these variations with the Russia’s 
backwardness.  However, within the westerners there are also deep divisions and disagreement.  While all 
generally agreed that Russia must adopt from the West, the westerners vary on the dilemma of which West 
to follow.  Some see the U.S. as the ultimate model to emulate, while others associate Russia’s progress 
with learning from the experiences of Germany, and Northern and Eastern Europe.  See Pavel A. 
Tsygankov and Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Dilemmas and promises of Russian liberalism,” Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 37 no. 1 (2004): 53-70. Pavel A. Tsygankov (Moscow State University); Andrei P. 
Tsygankov (Department of International Relations/Political Science, San Francisco State University). 
120 Russian realists are concerned over issues related to the structure of the international system as 
well as Russia’s strategy for adjusting to the post-Cold war international environment.  In general, Russian 
realists share similar views of the U.S. however; they diverge on foreign policy orientations.  A common 
realist theme is  that any Russian foreign policy strategy must be solely based upon national interests from 
the outset and on the state’s resolve in defending these national interests in relations with the outside world.  
A large number of Russian “realists also do not trust the US, pointing to multiple examples of 
unilateralism, arrogance even towards its allies, disregard for international organizations, and excessive 
reliance on the use of force.”  See Tatyana A. Shakleyina and Aleksei D. Bogaturov, “The Russian Realist 
school of international relations,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37 no. 1 (2004): 37-51 [42]. 
Tatyana A. Shakleyina (Institute of the United States and Canada, Moscow); Aleksei D. Bogaturov 
(Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Moscow). 
121 Shakleyina and Bogaturov, 42.  
122 Ibid. 
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attributable to divergent external threat perceptions.  On one side, there are those that 
associate the primary threat emanating from U.S. hegemony with an increasingly 
aggressive foreign policy in an effort “to turn the world into an American sphere of 
influence.”123  The opposing viewpoint is that the U.S. is not the main threat.  For these 
Russian realists: 
Russia must cooperate with the US and other countries in addressing more 
serious threats, such as controlling nuclear and conventional arms 
proliferation, terrorism, and drug-trafficking. This group faults [the] US 
not for its hegemonic foreign policy, but rather for the inadequate attention 
it gives to Moscow’s similar interests in addressing these threats.124 
The policy “position of the majority of Russian realists is one of pragmatism,” 
according to Shakleyina and Bogaturov, which “is significantly different from the views 
of both the liberals and of the realists of extreme orientation.  At the core of these 
differences lies the question of the very identity of the Russian State.”125  Russian 
“realists believe that [the] Russian identity should be associated with the historical 
tradition of a great power.”126  Shakleyina and Bogaturov argue that E. Ya. Batalov’s 
view of “velikoderhavnost (commitment to great power status) is at the heart of the 
culture and psyche of Russia.  This cultural archetype will continue to shape Russian 
perceptions of international events, regardless of its internal conditions.”127  Based on the 
foregoing, if Russian realism maintains a central position in the foreign policy debate 
within the inner circles of the Kremlin, then one might expect that any political, 
economic or security motivations toward the SCO are only part of a short-term solution 
to a means of achieving great power status in the long-term.  One might also argue that 
Russia is using the SCO as part of a long-term strategy to re-exert its hegemony over 
Central Asia.  Additionally, one can expect to see fluctuations in alliance partners over 
time.  This will largely depend on which Russian realist group has the most influence in 
Russian foreign policy circles at any given moment in time. 
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In order to address how Russia’s foreign policy thinking has developed toward 
securing its cultural, political and economic presence in Central Asia, this section will 
now turn to an analysis of the foreign policy orientation championed by the 
“Eurasianists”. Eurasianism encompasses a broad set of the ideas and views toward the 
Russian national identity and foreign policy orientation.  Specifically, Eurasianists 
emphasize “the uniqueness of the Russian geopolitical, historic and cultural position as a 
‘bridge’ between Europe and Asia.” 128  According to their mantra Russia should espouse 
Russian values and reject the subjugation of its interests to anyone else’s.  In addition, 
“Russia should take advantage of their peculiar qualities and enrich itself by establishing 
ties with both the West and the Orient.”129 
A. P. Tsygankov sets out a number of competing paradigms as an explanatory 
framework for schools of Russian geopolitical thinking.  His analysis is based on the 
collective works of several Russian academicians and authors who have a broader 
audience and are politically active.  Each offers different solutions for resolving problems 
associated with Russia’s post-communist experience, based on different assumptions 
about Russia’s role in the Eurasia region and the international system.  There is also some 
common ground among these various schools of thought regarding Russia’s political 
borders and external threats. 
The “westernizers” are satisfied with contemporary Russia Federation borders and 
can be closely associated with Jackson’s “liberal westernism” in their preferences for 
adjustment and democratization based on a western-shaped interdependence.  On the 
other end of the spectrum are the “expansionists”, similar to Jackson’s “fundamental 
nationalists,” who maintain a hard line position of Russia as a continental empire and see 
Russia’s political borders in Eurasia as beyond the FSU.  Their position is that Russian 
                                                 
128 Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumkin, “Russia and Central Asia: Evolution of Mutual 
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security goals in Eurasia should be power.  While pursuing this security strategy in 
Eurasia, Russia should seek unlimited political-military expansion and form alliances 
with Germany, Japan and Italy.  For this school, the primary external threat is from 
Atlanticism.  The support base for the “expansionist” resides in hard-line military and 
nationalistic movements (e.g. “Eurasia” and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy’s Liberal Democratic 
Party).130 
The “stabilizers” and “geoeconomists” agree with the “westernizers” that Russia’s 
political borders in Eurasia should be satisfied with the current Russian Federation’s 
geographic area.  However, they support a different vision of Eurasia, as an intersection 
of economic and cultural influences.  The “s tabilizers” advocate Russia’s security goals 
in Eurasia should be “stability” while the “geoeconomists” promote “development.”  To 
this end both take the position that Russia should pursue a multi-vectored foreign policy 
with no main partners, but disagree on how to pursue such a strategy.  The “stabilizers” 
favor politico-military balancing and champion state- led geoeconomics projects.  The 
“geoeconomists” seek transregional economic developments through state and private 
initiatives.  These two schools view the external environment as great power competition 
under interdependence and pluralism with the main source of threat to Russia being 
geopolitical and geoeconomics pressures from both the East and West.  The “stabilizers” 
support base derives from the state bureaucracy and nationally oriented private sector, 
while state-oriented parties, some liberal political movements, and the national/regional 
oriented private sector, back the “geoeconomists” approach. 131 
The “civilizationists” agree with the “stabilizers” and “geoeconomists” threat 
perceptions from East and West, but see these geopolitical and geoeconomic pressures as 
more dangerous and threatening to the survival of Russian security goals in Eurasia.  This 
school considers Russia’s political borders as the FSU.  They back a Russian security 
strategy in Eurasia as a blend of moderate politico-military expansion with geoeconomics  
 
 
                                                 




autarchy.  To pursue this policy, Russia should look to China, India and the other 
Eurasian states as its main partners.  The support base for this orientation is General 
Zyugnov and the Russian Communist Party. 132 
Based on the question of whether the SCO reflects the formation of an alliance, a 
“concert” or an “economic regime”, this chapter contends that the following best 
articulates a specific foreign policy position for each group.  The “civilizationists” best 
exemplify the view of the SCO as an alliance; the “stabilizers” approach offers the best 
explanation toward the “concert” of Central Asia premise; the “Geoeconomists” position 
suggests the most convincing argument for the SCO as an economic regime.  These three 
categories combined with Jackson’s pragmatic nationalists and the previous section 
coverage of the Russian pragmatic realism seem to offer the most compelling 
explanations as the matrix with which to further analyze Russia’s activities within Central 
Asia and the SCO framework. 
In sum, the pragmatic nationalists, Eurasianists and Russia pragmatic realists 
combine to form a consensus around which the Russian identity drives the foreign policy 
decision-making process.  In general, all maintain that Russia has a unique geographic 
mission, which encompasses in entirety of Eurasia but differ on whether Russia’s security 
goals in Eurasia should be survival, stability or development.  Additionally, they agree 
that Russia should be a great power, seeking its own interests within that space.  Based on 
these characteristics, as well as others outlined above, one could surmise that Russian 
interest in the SCO is only temporary.  The multilateral SCO offers Russia another 
mechanism for balancing against U.S. while bandwagoning with the Chinese as it 
continues its post-Soviet transition.  The SCO offers Russia a multilateral forum to bridge 
the gap between East and West in its economic development.  Cooperation in the SCO 
framework should be seen as serving Russia’s interests primarily first.  Collaboration 
within the SCO is only tactical steps in the game of great power politics and not some 
sort of altruistic or softening of Russia’s identity or its interests.  
Up to 2004, some Russian scholars argue that despite remaining tensions between 
Russia and the West, Putin “needed to solicit the support of the West for his domestic 
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reformist project, creating a friendly and predictable external environment and 
demonstrating that Russia is a trustworthy actor in the world affairs.”133  One can 
conclude that Putin’s support over a broad range of issues, including crossing all lines in 
the sand and making hitherto unimaginable concessions to the U.S. would precluded any 
notion that the SCO currently is a defensive alliance against the U.S.134  According to 
Medvedev, Putin is bucking the norms of traditional Russian geopolitical thinking.  Even 
today, he argues that while even today most of the Russian foreign policy elite still harbor 
the belief that territory is “sacrosanct and therefore strategic, while alliances, treaties and 
norms were shifting and tactical.  Putin seeks to reverse this paradigm, treating territory 
as a tactical resource and an alliance with the West as a strategic goal.”135  Putin’s move 
is away from a spatially defined national interest to a functionally defined Russian 
national interest.  Medvedev contends: 
For the first time in the Russian history, national interest is not linked to 
sheer power and territorial control, but rather to domestic reform, 
prosperity and efficiency of governance.  Putin still envisions Russia as a 
power, but in a different sense; his policy is not pro-Western … but pro-
Russian, of a pragmatic variety. … Putin’s policy of anchoring is driven 
by enlightened self- interest: he needs the West for Russia to succeed in a 
globalising [sic] world.136 
Other analysts continue to maintain that the foreign policy of the Russian elite, for 
2005 and beyond, continues to be at a fork in the road, whether to further integrate with 
the western world or continuing to seek a revival of great power status.137  However, this 
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characterization of the critical strategic dilemma is overplayed.  Based on the foregoing, 
Russian foreign policy choices need to be analyzed as short-term tactics to achieve the 
long-term goal of restoring its velikaya derzhava (great power) status. 
The constructivist approach offers a compelling case for explaining that Russia’s 
interest in the SCO.  Primarily driven by a change in Russian national identity, resulting 
from international and domestic events, gave Moscow a new set of priority interests 
associated with an East-West bridge strategy to achieve great power status again.  
However, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors may also offer a more compelling case 
and reach different conclusions for what is the primary motivation behind Russia’s 
specific interest in this one regional- level organization?  To consider this query this 
chapter will now consider if Russia views the SCO primarily as an alliance, a “concert” 
or an economic regime by considering its strategic incentives, economic agenda, and 
security interests in Central Asia. 
C. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC INCENTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Russia’s strategic incent ives in Central Asia are based on five points.  First, 
Russia needs to establish close partnerships with the regional states to promote regional 
stability.  Second, Russia requires unimpeded transit rights across Central Asia for the 
preservation of important partnerships with China, India and Iran. Third, the continuation 
of a common economic space with Central Asia can aid Russia’s path to economic 
modernization.  Fourth, Russia should use Central Asia’s geostrategic potential for 
practical military needs and in the preservation of Russia’s standing as a regional and 
world power.  Finally, Russia’s leading role in the region must be recognized by the 
international community.138  These core interests clearly have strong geopolitical aspect, 
but do not necessarily mean that Russia’s strategic incentives in Central Asia would lead 
Russia to enter into an alliance with China against the U.S. 
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Russia’s long-term interest in Central Asia is directly tied to its national security 
and economic modernization. 139  These general trends form a pivot around which 
interests of the Russian elites clash.  The SCO provides Russia an excellent opportunity 
as the mechanism for addressing the main problems associated with conflicts over 
disputed territories, the rise of political and radical Islam, and the fate of the Russian-
speaking population. 140  But do Russia’s strategic incentives in Central Asia support the 
assumption that the SCO is a Russia defensive alliance based on a perceived threat from 
U.S. hegemony and aggressive foreign policy? 141  Roy Allison contends, “Russia and 
China have at times sought to use the SCO as a macroregional balancing mechanism—
against the United States—though the Central Asian states are more interested in the 
existence of a balance between Russia and China in this body.”142  
In the first few years after the Soviet breakup, in the 1990s Russia’s policy toward 
Central Asia, with the exception of Kazakhstan, did not feature high on the scale of 
Russian political priorities.143  Within the CIS as a whole, Russia  placed greater 
importance on the Slavic republics and the Caucasus, whereas Central Asia was largely 
ignored.  However, after civil war erupted in Tajikistan and with the rise of the Taliban in 
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Afghanistan, Central Asia was only then recognized as an integral part of the zone of 
Russia’s special interests.144  While Russia was trying to work out a coherent strategy 
toward Central Asia, an opportunity appeared in the Shanghai Five to reassert its 
influence in Central Asia.  During the early 1990s Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan 
and China began to vie for influence in Central Asia to fill the vacuum created as Russia 
retreated from their decade long war in Afghanistan. 145  Specifically, this strategic retreat 
from Central Asia generated new fears concerning China’s growing presence in southern 
Kazakhstan and its growing influence in Kyrgyzstan, as well as concern for “the likely 
spillover of the Afghan conflict into Tajikistan,” further destabilizing a region already 
impacted by the Tajik civil war.146  Turkey was particularly worrisome to the Russian 
leadership.  Turkey’s forays into Central Asia paired with other Western powers, was 
seen as an attempt by outside forces “to isolate Russia from the Islamic world, and 
particularly such important geo-strategic partners as Iran and Pakistan.”147 
As the 1990s progressed, the Russian political elite across the political spectrum 
were forced to reconsider the “special relationship” between Russia and Central Asia.  
The heavy pro-Western accent during the early Yeltsin administration diminished as 
those that favored an Asiatic approach gained political and economic influence.148  The 
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influential industrial groups—dependent on Central Asian raw materials and semi-
finished products, as well as local markets for their own goods—found allies in the 
communists, who had their own ambitions of restoring the Soviet legacy.  Others called 
for “Eurasian unity” as a prerequisite for Russian-Central Asian relations, with shades of 
Russian imperialism and regaining influence in Russia’s traditional “sphere of 
influence.”149  Finally, the Russian military- industrial complex weighed in.  They 
“perceived the disintegration of the Soviet strategic space and depth, especially at the 
Southern flanks, as a direct threat to Russian security interests.”150 
By July 1995, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated “the CIS countries 
were now at the top of Russia’s foreign policy agenda.”151  However, others argue that 
Russia’s foreign policy toward Central Asia had matured since 1991, but remained “in a 
state of flux.”152  The lack of clear-cut objectives was reflected in Russia’s relations with 
the CIS in both bilateral and multilateral organizations.  Moscow’s policies were not the 
product of a well- thought out strategy, but instead a reaction to emerging crises.  
Furthermore, “Russia was unprepared for this role that required it to develop a new 
conception of its place in the transformed geopolitical environment.”153  This was 
highlighted by the arguments and disagreements, which took place among Russia’s 
political elite, economist circles and military leaders over Russia’s real interests.154  Irina 
D. Zviagelskaia, comments “Russia’s real interests in the various regions of the post-
Soviet space, including Central Asia, and of its main policy priorities, [were] often 
replaced by attempts by individual groupings, parties and leaders to use a given subject 
for their selfish ends.”155 
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Andrei Kortunov. Chairman of the Moscow Public Science Foundation also 
agrees that Russia’s Central Asian policy has been constantly subjected to these 
conflicting interests and paradigms.  He cautions that under these pressures “Russian 
policy towards Central Asia has become more versatile but also at the same time less 
predictable, compared to the ‘good old Soviet times’ when fewer basic factors were at 
work shaping its main parameters.”156  Under this frame of mind, one can begin to 
understand Russia’s motivations toward the SCO.  Accordingly, “Russian policy towards 
Central Asia has developed along three intertwined lines: political, military and 
economic.”157 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that geopolitical and geoeconomic 
pressures from the East and the West are the main threat to Russia and not an aggressive 
U.S. foreign policy.  The events of September 11, 2001, changed the mindset after 
NATO’s 1999 air campaign in the Balkans.  If Russia still perceived the U.S. as a priority 
threat, then they would not have been one of the most supportive countries in the wake of 
the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C.  Moscow stood by idly as the 
U.S. began to mass forces in and around Afghanistan.  Russia facilitated U.S. efforts to 
negotiate basing rights in Central Asia.  Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were able to 
negotiate bilaterally with the U.S. with little interference from Moscow.  Moscow’s 
perception of the priority threat now came from international terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalists, which was largely viewed as a domestic internal security issue prior to 
9/11 (e.g. Chechnya).  Russia sought to engage the U.S. in this effort because they could 
not financially or militarily engage this task on their own.  While U.S.-Russian security 
cooperation was based on similar threat perceptions, it is hard to imagine the Russians 
viewing the SCO as a defense alliance against the U.S. under the balance of threat theory. 
                                                 
156 Kortunov and Shoumkin, “Russia and Central Asia: Evolution of Mutual Perceptions, Policies and 
Interdependence,” 12. 
157 Ibid., 16. 
59 
D. RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AGENDA IN CENTRAL ASIA 
The critical reassessment of Russia’s modern self-perception and self- identity by 
various groups during the 1990s has provided different responses—from integration to 
isolationism, from liberalism to Eurasianism—but there had been a constant “shared 
sentiment that from shaping the world Russia should turn to adaptation to the external 
environment.”158  At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia now faces a new 
challenge of adapting to globalization. 159  The 1998 financial crisis highlighted Russia’s 
economic vulnerability and dependence on other states, while the 1999 Kosovo war and 
NATO enlargement showed Russia’s geopolitical predicament. Sergei Medvedev, of the 
George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies, summaries this dualism as:  
[T]he 1998 crisis demonstrated [that] Russia is irresistibly drawn (or 
‘seduced’) into the world of geoeconomy, and [the] NATO enlargement 
and Kosovo war illustrated that Russia is losing her traditional role [in] the 
world of geopolitics.  Taken together, these developments mapped 
Russia’s gradual drift from geopolitics to geoeconomy. 160 
This indicates that Russia no longer considered the U.S. as the primary threat.  
Thus, the explanation for the existence of the SCO was not based on alignment strategies.  
Instead, Russia views geoeconomic security as its focus.  The SCO presents Russia an 
opportunity to further its aim of returning to great power status through economic 
development strategies.  Russia’s “bridge” concept, using its legacy pipeline system for 
supplying the energy wealth of Central Asia to Europe and Asia., provides one such 
solution.  Nevertheless, Russia needed any means of hegemony it could muster to control 
these vital hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia. 
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1. Limited Economic Sovereignty & Domestic Imperatives 
The SCO provides Russia an outlet to meet the challenges and imperatives of 
globalization.  Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has charted a new foreign policy agenda 
“dictated by domestic concerns, an awareness of the systemic crisis … and a sense of 
competitive pressures of globalization.”161  Putin’s approach is clearly based on the 
linkage between domestic and foreign policy. 162  Evidence of Russia’s energy policy 
cooperation within the SCO institutional framework would demonstrate Russian 
commitment to the SCO as an international economic regime.  However, Russia’s use of 
bilateral sidebar agreements during SCO annual summits or the use of Russian state 
mechanisms, such as Gazprom in a hammer-anvil energy policy strategy shows a 
weakness in the international regime approach to the SCO from the Russian perspective. 
Russia’s goal of achieving great power status is complicated by the twin 
challenges of finite resources and the reality that its traditional assets (e.g. strategic rocket 
forces), have lost their traditional significance.  Medvedev contends, “[f]or the first time 
in her modern history Russia does not have the resources to match her traditional global 
role.”163  Overall, Russian foreign policy has become more associated with domestic 
imperatives.  Psychologically, the crises in the FSU during the 1980s and 1990s 
influenced the historically sacred outlook toward territorial thinking, which began to be 
viewed “in functional terms: is it useful, cost-effective and sustainable?”164  Regime 
change, also gave rise to economic interests which, if “not always directly translated into 
foreign policy acts … create a pragmatic de-ideologized context for policy-making.”165 
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Medvedev insists that since the collapse of the USSR “the economic variable has become 
much more closely, indeed intimately, integrated into the global market at various levels.  
Russia’s integration into the world economy is primarily driven by gas and oil 
exports.”166  Russia “has 33 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves and provides 40 
percent of Europe’s natural gas needs.”167  The final imperative Russia faces in 
globalization is with respect to international and regional institutions.168  The SCO is just 
one example. 
Moscow’s first attempts to establish the Eurasian Economic Community, on par 
with and as an EU counterpart, failed to materialize.169  Later attempts to form a 
Common Economic Space among Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan also failed to 
develop on the eve of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections.  These unsuccessful 
attempts forced Moscow to reconsider its multilateral approach to its relation with its 
former republics as all were transitioning in the post-Soviet space.  In the end, Russia 
realized it needed to shift its policy focus of its economic efforts from multilateral 
arrangements toward stronger bilateral relations to jump-start its modernization and 
increase its economic sovereignty. 
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The 1998 Russian crisis and associated “financial collapse highlighted the overall 
systemic crisis in Russia and indicated the limited domestic resources for the protection 
of ‘national interests’ in foreign policy.”170  The quick retreat of portfolio investors from 
the emerging markets and the sharp fall of world oil prices to levels far below Russia’s 
production costs demonstrated the true limits of Russia’s economic sovereignty. 171  The 
financial “crisis defined the parameters of decreasing state capacity in Russia, but also 
underscored Russia’s growing dependence on the global financial and raw materials 
markets.”172  For the first time, Russia found itself integrated into the world economy to a 
far “greater, and riskier, extent than had been envisaged by the masterminds of the Soviet 
oil policy in the 1970s and 1980s, and the architects of the Russian financial markets in 
the 1990s.”173  In the final analysis, the 1998 crisis accentuated “the fact that Russian 
foreign policy is staged under the conditions of limited economic sovereignty of the 
nation.”174 
2. Energy as a Strategic Instrument in Central Asia 
These conditions of limited economic sovereignty forced Russia to reevaluate its 
global and regional economic postures.  Russia began to use the energy trade as a 
strategic instrument in Central Asia.175  In the face of increased U.S. foreign direct 
investment and Russia’s own limited financial assets; Russia generated an energy 
strategy based on three goals.  First, Russia has insisted that the Transneft, the Soviet 
legacy pipeline system, be given priority use for energy exports from Central Asia.  
Second, Moscow heavily promoted Russian oil and gas firms and their participation to 
the maximum extent possible in Central Asian energy projects.  Third, Moscow tried “a 
variety of instruments to block projects that do not promote Russian perceived 
interests.”176  Roy Allison, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Royal Institute 
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of Internal Affairs (Chatham House) speculates that these strategies will likely produce a 
soft hegemony over the Central Asian states and is “likely to result in the medium term 
form of dependence on Moscow in energy policy [rather] than [in] military policy.”177 
Russia recently signed a new agreement on the transportation of natural gas with 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that according to some analysts, allocates to each 
partner a more equable role than was the case with such agreements in the past, but 
according to others will bring a further tightening or Russia’s grip on the regional energy 
trade.178  In January 2002 Putin called for the creation of a “Eurasian alliance of gas 
producers”, uniting Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, through their 
common pipeline system managed by Gazprom. 179  Putin emphasized the importance of 
such a historical effort, which he said, would be capable of “introducing an element of 
stability to the transportation of gas on a long-term basis.”180  While this grand union of 
gas exporters has not been realized, “Gazprom has been successful in concluding a series 
of key agreements with Central Asian countries that tied them into long-term structural 
relationships with Russia.”181 The first significant deal signed under these new auspices 
was the creation of KazRosGas.  This strategic venture was designed between the 
Russian state Gazprom and Rosneft companies and Kazakh KazMunayGaz for selling 
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development and operation of new energy fields and the unification of the regulatory 
guidelines for controlling the operation of the entire gas transport system.  Additionally, 
Gazprom is seeking a long-term, 25-year agreement on gas exports.182 
In April 2003, Gazprom achieved a like-minded long-term contract with 
Turkmenistan. 183  Finally, in May 2003 Gazprom was able to conclude major agreements 
with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 184  In essence, the Kremlin through its vassal Gazprom 
has sought to unify the entire Central Asian pipeline system and lock up Central Asian 
regimes and their energy resources to Moscow for the long-term.185  Moscow’s use of 
Gazprom bilaterally demonstrates Russia’s desire for pursuing a regional hegemonic 
policy over access to energy resources and energy transit routes outside of the SCO 
framework.  Russia has also approached China bilaterally when it comes to economic 
cooperation and not multilaterally within the SCO. 
Energy cooperation is also important for Sino-Russian interaction when it comes 
to the Central Asian states. In October 2004, Putin along with Foreign Minster Sergei 
Lavrov, visited China.  Putin characterized the trip as a “breakthrough both strategically 
and economically.”186  Details on the talks involved signing thirteen agreements: 
including finalizing the demarcation accord over their shared 4,200-kilometer border as 
well as agreeing to a protocol outlining Chinese backing for Russian accession into the 
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World Trade Organization. 187  Additionally, Putin heralded an agreement to increase 
bilateral trade to $80 billion by 2010, a four fold increase.  The Russian delegation also 
publicized that the Chinese had pledged to invest $12 billion in Russia’s Far East and 
Siberia, largely in the energy and timber industries and infrastructure projects.188  These 
examples underline the basic premise that Sino-Russia relations outside the SCO 
primarily lies in economic and energy cooperation, rather than a defensive alliance (circa 
2004).189 
3. The Outlook: Does Russia view the SCO as an International 
Economic Regime?  
Russia’s economic incentives toward Central Asia are an amalgamation of the 
“Eurasianist” East-West bridge vision, modern pipeline politics, and reactions to the 1998 
financial meltdown. The political debate concerning Russia’s Central Asia economic 
policy has evolved from an initial reluctance to pump money into the more “backward” 
states to a realization that through energy cooperation lays the path for Russia’s move 
from “a second-rate great power” to a great power again.190  Russia has by-and- large 
chosen to employ a bilateral approach to support its economic agenda in Central Asia and 
China. 
For Russia, the SCO remains more of a talk shop on energy pipeline routes rather 
than a collaborative effort for pooling resources in a long-term economic strategy.  Thus, 
if Russia’s interest in the SCO is best described as an international economic regime, then 
Russian policy actions should be characterized in either one of two ways.  The SCO is 
merely a coordination forum where Russia is not constrained from pursuing separate 
energy policies from the other members.  Another potential characterization of Russia’s 
dealings within the SCO as a regime is based on political power.  This approach would  
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consider Russian business activities as not promoting collective gains.  Instead, the SCO 
reflects Russia’s political power to enhance its own economic growth through 
compulsory strategies to limit the choices of the Central Asian states. 
E. RUSSIAN SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin embarked on various projects 
to sustain a forward security zone or security buffer in Central Asia, with the expressed 
aim of distancing the Russia Federation from a variety of emerging threats.  Moscow 
chose to emphasize the external nature of these threats to justify a network of military-
security arrangements, as well as securing Russian access to military facilities in the 
Central Asian states.191  The result of these policies has kept the Central Asian regimes, 
“to varying degrees, in a form of security dependence on Moscow and confirmed Russia 
as the primary, if progressively weakening, security manager for the region.”192 
Omnibalancing would expect to see both external and domestic threats driving 
alignment choices for maintaining the status quo of the weak Central Asian regimes.  
However, Russia’s choice to highlight the external nature of the threat does not support 
the view that Russia sees the SCO as a concert.  Instead, Russia has chosen to rely on 
other Russian- led multilateral institutions and sought direct bilateral agreements with 
individual SCO members in its security strategy in Central Asia. 
1. Russian Reaction to Crises in the Former Soviet Union  
The foundation of Russia’s security and military relations with its Central Asian 
neighbors are regulated by the May 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security.  Later, 
this mandate was expanded to include the functions of “collective defense” based on the 
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impact of the Tajik civil war and the need for direct Russian military intervention. 193  
Interestingly both the Central Asian elites and the Tajik opposition were largely 
“prepared to accept Russia’s role as an intermediary and a direct ‘legitimate’ participant 
in the process of conflict resolution, if not a guarantor of regional political 
settlements.”194  The Taliban’s seizure of Kabul in September 1996 further heightened 
the awareness of a new threat to regional security in Central Asia.  Regional powers, such 
as Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan quickly reacted in opposition to the Taliban’s 
growing regional influence.  The Taliban’s success in Afghanistan and their zealotry 
“gave impetus to a new cooperativeness among parties engaged in the inter-Tajik peace 
talks, as both sides and their foreign patrons recognised [sic] the need for a united front 
against the Taliban.”195 
Based on their experience drawn from a series of FSU regional crises, Moscow 
began to consider that the need for direct military intervention in the future might 
increase, and thus, new mechanisms were needed to aid Russia’s security policy toward 
Central Asia.196  Some have argued that the recent “outbreaks of insurgency and 
terrorism have created a region-wide sense of alarm that has, in turn, contributed to a 
renewed sense of urgency to find formulas to enhance cooperation in the region.”197  The 
SCO may be one avenue to reduce the costs associated with providing “collective 
security” in Central Asia; however, the Russian security situation changed after 
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September 11th.  Russia recognized the need to pursue a collective security arrangement 
that included “the need to share security responsibilities in Central Asia related to 
counterterrorism with western states and even China.”198  Russia initially accepted the 
inevitability of enhanced U.S. strategic presence in Central Asia in the build up to 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  Yet in the interlude, Russia’s regional policy has been 
increasingly “framed in a context of domestic political concerns about Russian strategic 
displacement in the region.”199  Since 2002, Putin has shown a greater determination to 
stem the erosion of Russia’s security posture and influence in the region.  Allison 
contends that under Putin the Russian position toward the anti-terrorism collation forces 
has been basis on the status of Russia’s own bilateral relations with its former republics. 
He has tried various multilateral and bilateral means to reinvigorate his 
flagging military relationships with Central Asian leaders and revive 
Russia’s broader military-security influence in Central Asian, using the 
rationale of a common counterterrorist struggle.  In a number of respects, 
after a short honeymoon period until perhaps spring 2002, these measures 
have fostered a dynamic of rivalry rather than synergy and cooperation 
with other powers active in the region. 200 
By 2003, even several Russian commentators became increasingly concerned 
over the growing differences between the U.S. and Russia over the weight of priorities in 
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the global war on terrorism. 201  Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov went so as far as to 
suggest that while U.S. remained in Central Asia, the two countries strategies should be 
“synchronized.”202  This call for greater synchronization was reiterated in later comments 
by CSTO secretary-general Nikolai Bordyuzhas’ call for CSTO-NATO parity in Central 
Asia.203 
2. Russian Efforts to Reestablish a Forward Security Zone in Central 
Asia 
The CSTO is the primary example of Russian efforts to re-establish a forward 
security zone in Central Asia, post-September 11, 2001.204  The May 2002 decision to 
create the CSTO by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was based on the 
reactivation of long standing plans to create a joint CIS rapid reaction force needed to 
support “collective security”.  By 2003, the framework included a joint command center 
in Moscow with a rapid reaction force based in Central Asia.  The plan also called for a 
common air defense architecture and a coordination in foreign, security and defense 
policies. 
The CSTO is the latest attempt to enhance Russia’s standing as a reliable 
“security manager” in Central Asia, but is not without its shortfalls. The main challenge 
Russia faces while modifying the CSTO in Central Asia is the fact that the core states of 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have opted out of any operational plans.  Even the Central 
Asian member states of the CSTO probably doubt Russia’s capacity for effective and 
impartial military intervention in the region, which places in question possible 
peacekeeping operations, or even major counter-narcotics activities, under the guise of 
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the CSTO.  Supporting the various military-security networks are the 201st Division with 
5,500 military personnel and a large contingent of border guards in Tajikistan. Russia’s 
recent success in facilitating the reconstitution of a forward security zone in Central Asia 
was the opening of the Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan with 500 personnel and 20 aircraft.  
This military facility provides Russia with a jumping off point for Russian military and 
security operations throughout Central Asia.205 
Russia still dominates this new organization militarily and the CSTO seems to 
overlap other efforts by the SCO and NATO.206  The actual extent to which CSTO-
NATO parity can be achieved seems limited to counter-narcotics cooperation. 207  There 
is no evidence supporting a Russian move for NATO-CSTO parity in command 
structures or actual cooperation in military operations.  Despite Nikolai Bordyuzha’s calls 
for coordination on regional security policies, Russia has also attempted to halt the 
reliance on these other organizations by seeking closer bilateral ties with the Central 
Asian States.208  In the Russian lens, these security agenda items indicate the perceived 
loss of prestige and not an external threat form the American forces operating in Central 
Asia.  Nevertheless, these agenda items continue to demonstrate a paradox in Russian 
military strategies.  For all the talk of regional security, Russia continues to pursue its 
own intraregional defense and security posture in doctrine and deeds.209 
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3. The Outlook: Fading Hopes of being a Reliable Security Manager 
Multilateral organizations provide Russia with important mechanisms for 
pursuing its foreign policy.  Since September 11, 2001, Russia has been using the CIS, 
along with the CSTO and SCO, to promote its role as a Eurasian regional leader in the 
global fight against terrorism. 210  Russia’s resort to multilateral structures in anti-
terrorism is becoming a key feature of its national security strategy.  This is a novel 
feature of Russian foreign policy and demonstrates the challenges facing Moscow as it 
attempts to remain the primary security manager for the Central Asian states. 
Moscow’s choice of practicing its regional security interests, mostly through CIS 
structural arrangements and bilateral relations with its former republics, demonstrates the 
tactical nature of its security arrangements.  Specifically, Russia’s participation within 
both the CIS CSTO and SCO RATS, demonstrates the limits of its cooperation as well as 
the contradictions in its foreign policy..  Medvedev expressed this dualism in Russia’s 
security (circa 2003) as the following: 
For all the talk of the war in Kosovo and NATO enlargement, no major 
security threats are identified on the Western front where Russia is 
evolving towards a postmodern ‘soft security,’ economization, acceptance 
of dominant norms and institution-building process.  The true Russian 
front line is in the East and South where traditional ‘hard security’ still 
applies and national interests are defined in modern terms of sovereignty, 
balance, territorial control, and border defense.211 
By 2005, regional security cooperation with the U.S. in Central Asia was strained, 
and disappeared as Moscow sought a closer relationship with Beijing, both bilaterally and 
multilaterally through the SCO.  The Sino-Russian geopolitical counterweight positioning 
against the U.S. was evident in the 2005 SCO Heads of State communiqué and the Sino-
                                                 
210 For a detailed examination of the geopolitical storylines that developed amongst the Russian 
political class in the first 6 months after the September 11 attacks, and the attitudes of various socio-
demographic groups in Russia to aspects of these storylines, see John O’Loughlin, Gearoid O´ Tuathail, 
and Vladimir Kolossov, “Russian geopolitical storylines and public opinion in the wake of 9–11: a critical 
geopolitical analysis and national survey,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37, no. 3 (2004): 281–
318.  For additional analysis of the post-September 11th environment see S. Neil Macfarlane, “The United 
States and Regionalism in Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 (May 2004): 447-461; Annette 
Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order,” International Affairs 80, no. 3 
(May 2004): 485-502; and Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (London: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003), esp. ch 7, pp 115-132. 
211 Medvedev, “Russia at the End of Modernity: Foreign Policy, Security, Identity,” 53.  . 
72 
Russian exercise “Peace Mission 2005”.  Russia’s political repositioning and potential 
change in threat perception by would counter omnibalancing and would indicate that 
these moves by Russia reflect a balance of threat mentality. 
Although Russia participates in the SCO and is interested in maintaining the 
status quo in Central Asia, one should not conclude that the SCO reflects a “concert” in 
the Russian lens.  Russia still attempts to maintain its last vestiges of a reliable security 
manager through the military arm of the CIS, the CSTO, and not the SCO’s RATS.  
Those who champion this position within Russian foreign policy circles talk about 
CSTO-NATO parity and not SCO-NATO parity.  Some might point to the establishment 
of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure Center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan as a sign 
of the establishment of a concert.  However, Russia already has three other regional anti-
terrorism centers as part of the CIS framework located in Bishkek, Minsk and Armenia. 
Additionally, Russian avoided using the SCO RATS as a security or intervention 
mechanism for maintaining the status quo during the 2005 events in Kyrgyzstan.  Russia 
did not overtly act at all which may indicate two things: that Russia either could not react 
in a compressed timeframe, or alternatively, Moscow did not see the “Tulip” revolution 
as a “colored” revolution, but as a regime change with new leaders cut from the mold of 
the old regime and who they could still do business with.  The hardening of an 
institutional arrangement within the SCO aligns with the neoliberal international regime 
theory for solving dilemmas of common aversion and preventing particular outcomes 
(e.g. regime change) than neorealist omnibalancing. 
F. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
Looking at the events of the 1990s, the above analysis clearly demonstrates that 
the Russian political elites’ debate concerning Russia’s identity shaped Russia’s interests 
and ultimately changed its foreign policy orientation with respect to the Central Asia and 
the SCO.  Central Asia and the SCO became a bright spot in Russian foreign policy.  This 
is especially true, when comparing Central Asia to other areas of the FSU where Russian 
attempts at remaining a viable leader through the CIS and other multilateral economic 
organizations failed to achieve the desired results.  The SCO is a prestigious multilateral 
institution that other countries outside of Central Asia want to join.  Russia’s foreign 
policy was constrained by a lack of economic resources to carry out its role as a 
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traditional great power.  Russia’s limited economic sovereignty resulted in a lack of 
prestige in its former sphere of influence.  This prompted Russia to pool its resources to 
address short-term issues.  These factors are associated with its former superpower status 
and required a remedy.  The limitations of Russian foreign policy became increasingly 
evident in Russian approaches for seeking solutions associated with the crises inside and 
outside of its former borders. Specifically, when considering how to react to transnational 
threats, global financial markets or NATO enlargement. 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, Russia’s actions within the SCO have 
been modest.  Instead, Russia has pursued bilateral sidebar arrangements in economic and 
security areas.  Economically the Kremlin has ensured Russian oil and gas firms’ access 
to Central Asian energy resources to keep up with the Chinese not through the SCO, but 
bilaterally with the Central Asian states.  At the same time, Russia, in an effort to remain 
a viable security manager and achieve some level of parity with the U.S. and NATO, has 
pursued security guarantees through the CSTO and individual military arm sales with the 
Central Asian states. 
The fading fears of Russian imperialism in Central Asia have opened the door for 
new regional enthusiasm for strategic partnerships with Russia.  However, in spite of all 
the rhetoric from Moscow echoing strategic partnerships with Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek 
and Tashkent for countering the dangers of extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking and 
separatism, these agreements are poorly named and ineffective.212  With the exception of 
the Russian-Tajik partnership, these agreements “are tactical agreements that came into 
being as a result of a confluence of interests; when the interests change the alliances can 
be expected to shift.”213 
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Russia’s overall motivations toward the SCO are ambiguous at times.  Regional 
and world events shape the Russian identity, which is the primary variable driving 
Moscow’s interest in Central Asia and the SCO.  Russia’s inconsistency in its foreign 
policy toward Central Asia is directly attributed to how Russian political elites reacted to 
external and internal crises.  The dualism of Russian approaches toward the SCO 
highlight Russia’s “schizophrenically split between modernity and postmodernity [sic], 
national myths and globalization, ‘Jihad and McWorld,’ security challenges and 
economic imperatives.”214  The aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 paired 
with increasing globalization pressures, present new opportunities for greater 
synchronization and congruence between Russia and the West.  This precludes the idea of 
the SCO being an alliance against the U.S. and NATO.  This was evident in the field of 
security where Russia and the West were converging toward a common understanding of 
threats, and a similar formulation of national interests circa 2002.  Thus, the Russian 
rationale for the SCO in its early stages of development should not be characterized as a 
defensive alliance against the U.S.  Only later, when Russia created a CSTO rapid 
reaction force specifically designed for Central Asia—as a counterweight to NATO’s 
anti-terrorism coalition—is there any evidence that Russia changed its perception of 
threat.  However, this was not a balance of threat in a classic Walt’s sense (e.g. U.S. 
offense aggressive intentions against Russia), but a threat of a continuing loss in prestige 
based on the Russian Eurasianist identity.  Critical to this is Russia’s choice of seeking an 
equal partnership with the U.S. and NATO through the CIS CSTO and not the SCO 
RATS.  Others may analyze the events of 2005 in Central Asia and in the status of Sino-
Russian bilateral relations to determine if Russia has indeed changed its perception of 
threat and formed an alliance with China against the U.S. 
The Eurasianist policy has led to a paradox for Russia:  In its bid to continue 
playing the role as the principal security manager for Central Asia, Russia finds itself 
trapped.  Russia is brimming with ambitions to play this role, yet it is constrained by 
serious political, economic and security problems while having to cope with new 
neighbors and an unprecedented level of activity from other states vying for influence 
and pursuing their own interests in Central Asia.  Eurasianist thinking is flawed because 
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it is rooted in a selective analysis of Russia’s past, which might preclude it from serving 
as a viable blue print for a twenty-first century Russia foreign policy.  However, this does 
not mean that political elites will avoid using Eurasianism for addressing contemporary 
issues at any given time or place.  Future analysis of Russia’s policies toward Central 
Asia requires a critical understanding of the complexities of Eurasianist thinking, 
especially for noticing the threads within Russian foreign policy rhetoric and behavior by 
determining which school of Eurasianism has the political momentum at any given time. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, Russia’s objectives and interests in Central Asia 
are interwoven between political, economic and security interests and selective 
application of Eurasianist thinking.  Each has the potential to clash with one another, 
ultimately making it likely that Russia will face trouble given the complexities of the 
Central Asia and the SCO member states vying for influence in the region.  However, 
there is little evidence that under Putin’s leadership Russia has developed a long-term 
regional strategy toward Central Asia that would integrate its political, security, energy 
and economic interests. Thus, “[i]n the absence of such a strategy it has been difficult to 
promote those interests effectively through the instruments it has available.”215  The SCO 
offers Russia the best means to secure its short-term goals while at the same time creating 
the conditions necessary for the long-term goal of reviving its great power status by 
maintaining a semi-hegemony over the Central Asian region.  
                                                 



























V. THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE TOWARD THE SHANGHAI 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
What is driving China’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO)? In order to understand Chinese motivations behind their participation in the SCO, 
one must cons ider the broader factors influencing China’s new engagement in Asia in the 
twenty-first century, as well as its regional relationship with Russia and its former Soviet 
Central Asian Republics. 
During this process of reengagement, several factors have influenced China’s 
identity and current foreign policy outlook.  These include regional and international 
reactions to Tiananmen Square; the 1998 Asian financial crisis; China’s reassessment of 
regional multilateral institutions; the 1999 Kosovo crisis, paired with NATO’s eastward 
expansion; the events of September 11, 2001; and the renewed U.S. strategic interests in 
Central Asia.  These events have shaped the way Beijing views Central Asian regional 
developments and larger international politics.  The SCO’s development is a reflection of 
China’s increasingly complex and multifaceted engagement with its neighbors, as well as 
its reaction to the post-Cold War international system and vision of promoting a multi-
polar world.  The SCO communiqués contain the tenets of Chinese foreign policy 
expression, which reflects its large contribution to its leadership within the SCO.  
Beijing’s actions within the SCO framework should be considered as part of an overall 
long-term strategy supporting its economic security.  In this vein, the stability, security 
and development of the Central Asian states are prerequisites for its overall national 
security strategy. 
This chapter argues that Chinese economic security is the primary motive driving 
its Central Asian policy and participation in the SCO.  This indicates that the Chinese see 
the SCO more as an international regime and not as a military alliance.216  Thus, the 
primary threat to Chinese interests is not U.S. foreign policy or the presence of U.S. 
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military bases in Central Asia.  The Chinese view the shift in U.S. priorities in Central 
Asia, from conducting anti-terrorism operations to promoting legitimate democratic 
reforms as a destabilizing force.217  Although the Chinese view these perceived changes 
in U.S. foreign policy as a destabilizing force, it is not considered the primary threat 
facing SCO member states.  Chinese scholars believe that the “Three Evils”218 will 
capitalize on American and non-governmental organizations support for promoting 
democratic reforms in the Central Asian regimes.  This works to China’s advantage when 
promoting their anti-extremist agendas.  Domestically, the Chinese view its primary 
threat from the “Three Evils” as separatism, whether in the Taiwan or the Xinjiang 
provinces.  In Central Asia, the main threat originates in the remnants of the Afghan 
Taliban regime.  Currently, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) has been singled out as the main threat to 
security, stability and development of Central Asia.  The Chinese identify HT as 
comprising of terrorist and extremists with its support coming from outside Central Asia 
and originating in the Middle East.219 
This chapter is organized into four sections. First, this chapter will begin with a 
review of the international and domestic events that influenced China’s twenty-first 
century Asian-wide interests and policy choices.  The creation of a new regional posture 
and outlook allowed China to use the SCO to address its short- and long-term security 
and economic interests, as well as support its strategic objectives.  Second, this chapter 
will examine Chinese strategic incentives for fostering improved relations with Russia 
and the Central Asian states.  Third, it will consider China’s economic agenda in Central 
Asia, as well as its economic priorities in its relationship with Russia and the Central 
Asian republics.  Finally, this chapter will explore how China perceives traditional and 
non-traditional threats in its policies toward Central Asia. 
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B. CHINESE IDENTITY DRIVEN INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
During the 1990s, five events shaped Chinese perceptions of its regional position 
and the international environment.  These events had a cumulative effect and laid the 
groundwork for China’s new engagement in Asia and surrounding regions in the twenty-
first century.  Unlike the Russian case, the Chinese identity was not greatly impacted by 
events in Central Asia.  Instead, Asia-Pacific events weighted more heavily, along with 
international events which shaped the Russian identity.  These events cannot be directly 
tied to changes in Chinese foreign policy behavior in Central Asia, but are a general 
lattice from which Beijing was able to use to expand its bilateral and multilateral ties in 
crafting a new regional approach toward Central Asia. 
The first event shaping China’s policy was the reaction of the Asian states to the 
killing of civilians on June 4, 1989 by the Chinese military.  International reaction was 
extremely harsh, but regionally China observed some unexpected results.  While Japan 
condemned the use of force and South Korea expressed the incident as regrettable, the 
“Southeast Asian states remained silent or, as in the Thai and Malaysian cases, noted 
simply that it was an ‘internal affair’.”220  According to David Shambaugh, “ASEAN’s 
desire to engage China at this critical time left an impression on the leadership in Beijing. 
While the rest of the world was doing its best to isolate China, ASEAN chose to reach out 
to Beijing.”221 
Outside of Asia, China found itself isolated from the rest of the world following 
the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the end of the Cold War and the ensuing 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  This isolation restricted China’s “omnidirectional” 
foreign affairs policies.  Only rapid economic growth in the 1990s provided China with 
an opportunity to exert more influence in the post-Cold War international environment.  
China successfully completed several major agreements with the U.S., Russia, the EU 
and Japan, thereby shifting “the focus of its omnidirectional diplomacy to a strategic 
relationship with the major powers.”222  In 1996, China signed a “strategic cooperation 
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partnership” with Russia,223 followed by a 1997 “constructive strategic partnership” with 
the U.S.  Furthermore, in 1998 China established a “full-scale partnership” with the EU, 
and an “amicable and cooperative partnership for peace and development in the Asian 
region” with Japan.  Chinese economic growth, despite its international isolation, was a 
key factor that permitted China to run its domestic affairs as it saw fit.  The industrialized 
countries needed China’s participation in the global economy, which provided China with 
the flexibility in its foreign policy to seek relations on the best terms possible for China. 
The second event shaping China’s policy was the 1998 Asian financial crisis.  
Despite fears of a spillover of the crisis into China, Chinese leaders were able to prevent 
the spread of the “Asian Flu” to China’s vulnerable banking sector. The Chinese financial 
system was able to navigate through this turmoil primarily because it already had 
currency controls in places where they were lacking in the ASEAN counties.  “[I]ts 
currency was not convertible on capital accounts, and Beijing possessed a large reservoir 
of foreign exchange reserves—all of which helped to buffer the Chinese economy.”224  
The Chinese leadership pursued a path of not devaluating the currency while offering 
modest, favorable loans to the Southeast Asian states, which was in contrast to the advice 
of the International Monetary Fund and other international creditors.  Chinese “assistance 
punctured the prevailing image of China in the region as either aloof or hegemonic and 
began to replace it with an image of China as a responsible power.”225  Shambaugh 
contends the merits of China’s “actions [also] boosted the confidence of China’s leaders 
in their role as regional actors.”226 
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The third catalyst to China’s new regional policy was a complete reassessment of 
regional multilateral institutions.  This was not driven by a single event, but was reflected 
as more of a gradual process between 1997 and 2001.227  During this timeframe, “the 
Chinese government significantly modified its assessment of regional, and particularly 
security-related, multilateral organizations.”228  Prior to the mid-1990s, the Chinese elite 
had “viewed such organizations as potential tools of the United States that could be used 
to contain it.”229  In time, Chinese perceptions toward these organizations gradually 
“evolved from suspicion, to uncertainty, to supportiveness.”230  Furthermore, Chinese 
officials soon found that the cooperative security approaches associated with these 
regional organizations matched its own new security concept (NSC) and were an area for 
further dialog and interaction.  Specifically, the NSC is aimed at adjusting the 
internationa l order away from Cold War legacy thinking and approaches.231 Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin codified the NSC at the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament in March 1999 as: 
The core of such a new concept of security should be mutual trust, mutual 
benefit, equality and cooperation. The five principles of mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and 
peaceful co- existence and other universally recognized norms governing 
international relations make up the political foundation underpinning 
world peace. Mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity 
constitutes the economic guarantee for world peace. Dialogues, 
consultations and negotiations by parties concerned on an equal footing 
are the correct approach to resolving disputes and safeguarding peace. The 
establishment of a new concept of security and a new just and fair 
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international order is the only way to fundamentally promote a healthy 
development of the disarmament process and provide the guarantee for 
international peace and security. 232 
Unfortunately, within days of this speech the Chinese NSC was to face additional 
challenges, because during the same month NATO started Operation Allied Force. 
A fourth aspect to China’s new regional approach was the reaction of the Asian 
states to China’s call for the elimination of Cold War alliances.  Previously, while 
Chinese officials were traveling through Asia in 1997 had called for the abrogation of all 
international alliances, whether bilateral or multilateral.233  Beijing offered its NSC as an 
alternative to Cold War international relations.  However, these Chinese calls had an 
unintended reaction from its Asian neighbors and were ignored internationally.  “In fact, a 
number of Asian governments privately but sternly told Beijing that such calls were 
unwelcome and that they had no intention of severing their alliances with the United 
States.”234  This counter reaction caught Chinese officials off guard, as they had 
miscalculated “other countries assertiveness in defending their security ties with the 
United States.  Within a year Beijing had cooled its public rhetoric on the issue.”235 
The final aspect shaping Chinese regional engagements was the reaffirmation of 
Deng Xiaoping’s peace and development thesis.  Central to Deng’s 1985 dictum was the 
rejection of the inevitability of another world war due to the inherent instability of the 
international order.  Instead he proposed “that China’s guiding principle, both 
internationally and domestically, should continue to be ‘peace and development’ … to 
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pursue economic development, China needed a peaceful environment.”236  The 1999 
U.S.-led NATO Operation Allied Force and accidental targeting of the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade challenged Chinese belief in Deng’s “peace and development” theory.  U.S. 
willingness to use force with its vastly superior technology and weapon systems 
challenged another one of Deng premise, “that the leading hegemon, the United States, 
had entered a period of gradual decline. Yet by 1999, in the eyes of many Chinese 
analysts, neither Deng’s core thesis nor the corollary appeared to be valid.”237  The 
Chinese elite grasping of this unwelcome “realization spurred an intense domestic debate 
about the validity of the peace and development concept.”238 
After the aerial bombing campaign ended, the Chinese elite began to reassess 
Deng’s thesis.  Following several months of intensive discussions, a consensus emerged 
within the Chinese leadership. Chinese leaders believed that Deng’s general thesis was 
still accurate as an overall assessment of and guide to China’s foreign policy, “despite 
some notable ‘global contradictions’ (a code word for conflicts) and the fact that the 
United States did not appear to be in decline (just the opposite).”239  However, Chinese 
international affairs experts concluded that for a peaceful environment conducive to 
domestic development to emerge, China needed to be less passive and more proactive in 
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shaping its regional milieu.  This debate ended just after the 2000 U.S. presidential 
election. 240  During the 2000 U.S. presidential election ballot recount, the Chinese elite 
met for a three-week conclave to examine every aspect of U.S.-Sino relations.  “Chinese 
officials and analysts judged that there had been far too much volatility in the relationship 
over the previous decade, that this turbulence was not conducive to Chinese interests and 
goals.”241  The comprehensive review “concluded that China needed to stabilize and 
improve its relationship with the U.S., as the single most important country for China’s 
national interests.”242 
The social constructivist approach fails to offer a compelling case that these 
events forced a substantial Chinese identity shift based on the evidence presented.  
Rather, these five events, paired with Chinese responses to them, demonstrate learning in 
Chinese foreign policy decision-making.  While they do not directly pertain to Central 
Asia as a source, they do represent a new calculus from which China can act both 
regionally and internationally as a rising power.  Multilateral institutions and approaches 
are now a staple of Chinese foreign policy.  Bilateral relations can be furthered under 
such umbrellas.  Neither seems more important then the other, but in Central Asia and the 
SCO, China has been more effective in pursuing its interests through bilateral sidebar 
meetings at SCO meetings.  This was evident throughout 2003 when the SCO was still in 
its infancy as an intergovernmental organization.  After 2004, Beijing was more 
comfortable operating independently in Central Asia, with fewer constraints placed on its 
strategic incentives, economic agenda and security interests by Moscow. 
Geopolitical and geoeconomic factors may offer a more compelling case and  
reach different conclusions for what is the primary motivation behind China’s specific 
interest in this one regional- level organization.  To consider this conundrum this chapter 
will now consider if China views the SCO primarily as an alliance, a “concert” or an  
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economic regime by considering its strategic incentives, economic agenda and security 
interests in Central Asia. The next three sections will examine how China pursued these 
foreign policy goals. 
C. CHINESE STRATEGIC INCENTIVES IN CENTRAL ASIA 
This section will focus specifically on China’s policies toward Central Asia and 
the use of the SCO framework to achieve its strategic interests.  If there is overwhelming 
evidence that China’s geopolitical interests are driving its participation in the SCO, then 
one might consider the SCO a defense alliance with the Russians based on a perceived 
threat from U.S. hegemony and aggressive foreign policy. 243  Prior to the establishment 
of the Shanghai “Five”, the post-Soviet Sino-Russian partnership was largely defined in 
terms of political-security agreements.244 Both parties recognized that the lagging 
economic relationship needed to be brought in line with the political-security dimension 
of their strategic partnership.245  China also recognized that with the independence of the 
Central Asian republics, its geopolitical relations with Russia would be concentrated in 
the Northeast instead of the Northwest.246  In considering its Sino-Central Asian 
relations, China has been mindful of the “Russia factor” due to the historically close 
interdependence between the Central Asian states and other CIS members, especially 
Russia.  As the Central Asian republics transition from the Soviet era, they have looked 
for partners outside of the CIS framework.  The SCO provides a mechanism to meet this 
need while not disrupting the Central Asian states historical ties with Russia. 
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1. China and the Strategic Scene in Central Asia pre 9/11 
China recognized that the Central Asian states were subject to adverse influences 
from external powers during their transition from the Soviet era.  In the past, China 
regarded Russia as the main security manager for maintaining the stability of the Central 
Asia states and the surrounding areas.247  The Chinese and Russians share similar 
strategic approaches to maintaining regional stability and development while also 
interested in preventing other great and regional powers from gaining influence in the 
region.  However, they differ on the level of independence.  Russia had traditionally 
viewed Central Asia in their sphere of influence and sought to limit Chinese influence.  
China opposed this Russian conception and supported the Central Asian states’ 
independence and their ability to cooperate with all other countries.248 
Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, China was paranoid of the U.S. 
presence in Central Asia.  The Chinese viewed NATO’s eastward expansion, which 
included the Central Asian states joining NATO’s PfP program, with the accompanying 
joint exercises, as an U.S. attempt of containing China by threatening its security in the 
Northern and Western regions.249  While China did not explicitly express opposition to 
the Central Asia states participating in PfP, it nevertheless closely watched how NATO 
influenced the newly independent republics.  The latent evidence suggests that China was 
opposed to any U.S. scheme of building up its military presence, conducting exercises or 
using the Central Asian states as a tool for containing China.  The Chinese believed that 
part of the aim of  U.S. foreign policy and military cooperation in Central Asia was to 
threaten China’s security and to contain China’s strategic plans in Xinjiang; the other part 
of U.S. foreign policy being to contain Russia and weaken its influence in Central 
Asia.250 
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Shireen T. Hunter suggested that Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng’s April 1994 
trip to Central Asia was the catalyst for China’s advance into the region. 251  The raison 
d'être for the trip was “to reduce the hostility, the perceived threat from China in the 
region.”252  China was also increasingly concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism 
and the specter of Uighur nationalism and its impact on overall regional stability. 253  In 
addition, China saw an opportunity to push for a revival of the Silk Road. 
The broad outlines of Chinese foreign policies in Central Asia, evolving from the 
1994 trip, seem to be straightforward.254  “China has expanded it ties across Central Asia 
to stabilize its western frontier, gain access to the region’s energy resources, and balance 
Western influence in an area Beijing has traditionally viewed as Russia’s reserve.”255  By 
establishing closer ties with the Central Asian states, Robert Sutter suggests that Beijing 
may be better suited than Russia to address the threats stemming from “the linkage of 
religion and politics,” thus shielding the “Xinjiang Province and its ethnically Turkic 
population from outside Muslim and pan-Turkic influence.”256  However, Beijing still 
expressed some reservations about the Central Asian states’ resolve for eradicating the 
threat.257 
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2. Chinese Strategic Incentives in Central Asia post-9/11 
Some analysts, reviewing China’s moves within the SCO, suggest that one should 
consider the strategic dimension of its policy decisions.  Under these assumptions, 
China’s role in the new “Great Game” is characterized in three dimensions: first, as a 
counterweight to U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia; second, by gaining access to the 
energy resources and other strategic minerals in Central Asia; and third, by exploiting the 
fragile political situation in the Xinjiang province.  Indeed:  
China attaches importance to the elimination of bilateral irritants and to 
the consolidation of its economic relations with the countries on its 
western border.  Closer relations with the Central Asian countries through 
the Shanghai grouping also ensure non- interference by them in Xinjiang, 
which shares ethnic and religious affinities with them.258 
Other factors may also weigh in the rise of China’s interest in Central Asia.  The 
renewed U.S. engagement, post-September 11, 2001 may have involuntarily assisted the 
expansion of China’s position in Central Asia.  In Omurbek Tekebaev’s view: 
When the U.S. strengthened its position, China began to also show that it 
was interested in Central Asia. So, recently, the Chinese leadership told a 
meeting [of regional leaders] in Tashkent that it will invest about [$]4,000 
million dollars in the Central Asian countries. For example, Chinese 
leaders spoke openly about their intention to pay the full cost of about $1.5 
billion for the construction of a highway from China to Central Asia, via 
Kyrgyzstan. 259  
In addition, Niklas Swanstrom, Executive Director of the Program for Contemporary Silk 
Road Studies at Sweden’s Uppsala University points to Russia’ continued tenuous grip 
over the region as a reason why outside powers have gained increased influence in 
Central Asia.  However, he argues that the Chinese have outpaced U.S. and European 
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efforts because of their more effective policies, which entail comprehensive regional 
economic and secur ity investments.  These Chinese polices are also more appealing to the 
Central Asian states because of the lack of political strings which are attached to the U.S. 
and Russia aid offers.260 
3. The Outlook: Does China view the SCO as a Defensive Alliance? 
Walt’s explanation for how states’ calculate threat and make alignment choices is 
based on aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions; 
offensive intentions being the key variable.  Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. had an 
aggregate power advantage over China.  Additionally, the U.S. demonstrated its offensive 
capabilities throughout the 1990s culminating in the Air War over Yugoslavia.  The U.S. 
military presence in Central Asia after September 11, 2001, added proximity to Chinese 
perceptions of threat from the U.S.  Finally, China viewed a perceived U.S. containment 
strategy as a looming threat and as its offensive intention against China.  Nevertheless, do 
these four variables of balance of threat mean that China intends to use the SCO as a 
defensive alliance against the U.S.? 
The Chinese have already used the SCO to promote its strategic incentives and 
foreign policy interests in Central Asia.  China’s influence is evident in the language used 
for SCO joint declarations, especially as a means for voicing opposition to U.S. foreign 
policy.  So far, the SCO has come out in opposition to America’s decision to scrap the 
ABM, as well as the U.S. NMD initiative.  SCO declarations have also committed the 
regional group to a “One China” policy and support for China’s claims to Taiwan.  These 
examples are evidence of the SCO becoming a multilateral platform for prompting 
Chinese national interests.  Indeed this behavior may be latently anti-American in nature, 
but from China’s standpoint, the SCO should not be classified as a defensive alliance.  
Instead, there is evidence of a prestige factor associated with how the Chinese political 
elite think about the SCO. 
The SCO is a prestigious intergovernmental organization, which happens to 
support the broad spectrum of Chinese national security interests.  China is rapidly 
emerging as a world power. In a decade or two, it might directly challenge the supremacy 
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of the United States, Japan and Europe. But before this can happen, Beijing’s leaders will 
need to help stabilize the region, while creating good neighborly ties with the countries 
surrounding China’s borders.  In the future, this could ultimately give China political 
support, as well as economic leverage.  This objective has led Beijing to set up trade 
missions in every Central Asian country, invest in local enterprises, donate money to aid 
projects and give special attention to a high profile to new bodies, such as the SCO.  
Beijing views Central Asia as a bright spot in its foreign policy and China is eager to 
highlight the positive impact of the SCO.  The successes and recognition of the SCO has 
increased Chinese prestige both regionally and internationally, which China has cashed in 
on for furthering its foreign policy agenda and meeting its strategic incentives. 
China’s plans for the future of the SCO can be seen from remarks made at the 
August 2004 seminar entitled “SCO: New Model for Regional Cooperation.”261  The 
SCO’s Chinese Secretary-General, Zhang Deguang, commented on the SCO’s role as a 
new model for regional cooperation.  Deguang’s remarks focused on the existing 
cooperation in the political and economic arenas, as well as other areas such as science 
and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation and environmental protection 
in preparation for the SCO governmental heads’ meeting in September 2004.262  
General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) and president of the China International Strategy Society, 
provided comments on the future of the SCO as well.  General Guangkai’s speech 
entitled “Develop the ‘Shanghai Spirit,’ Promote Peaceful Development,” focused on the 
developmental perspectives for the SCO.  Highlighted were the implications for political, 
economic and trade, security and humanitarian concerns.263 China recognizes that the 
SCO is at a critical juncture and the near term steps for focusing and expanding its 
mission and organization will determine the road map for the next several decades. The 
initial establishment of good neighborly ties had brought about a wide-range of consensus 
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among SCO members.  The SCO’s solid institutional foundation ensures its healthy 
development and is a springboard for the SCO having “a broad and bright future.”264  
The PLA Chief of Staff further posited that the SCO “will have a positive impact on 
further safeguarding world peace and promoting the process of international political 
democratization.”265  China is also solidifying its position within the international 
community by promoting the SCO as a new model for post-Cold War multilateralism. 
Geopolitical undertones are rampant in the Chinese articulations of what the SCO 
is about and its potential.  Nevertheless, the economic and regional security variables 
have been the items stressed by the Chinese political elite.  The next two sections will 
consider how these variables might provide a better explanation of Chinese interests in 
Central Asia, and thus, their view of the SCO and its purpose.  
D. CHINESE ECONOMIC AGENDA IN CENTRAL ASIA 
The SCO provides China with a mechanism to solidify its relationships with 
Russia and the Central Asian states.  China’s leadership has put a face on the SCO as an 
organization that is committed to fighting and rooting out the “Three Evils” of 
international terrorism, extremism and separatism, as well as drug trafficking and 
international crime.  But there is little evidence that would support the SCO member 
states foregoing security interests in the SCO and instead focusing on creating an 
economic institution.  China has its own agenda for the future of the SCO and Central 
Asia.  China’s economic security concerns are shaping its foreign policy, which in turn 
directly influences the direction and role of the SCO.  China’s first mechanism of choice 
is to use their economic instrument of power to facilitate its macro and domestic security 
concerns.  However, one must bear in mind how China’s economic agenda within the 
SCO also supports its strategic incentives by curtailing the growing U.S. presence and 
influence in Central Asia. 
Chinese scholars cite four reasons why increased trade and energy cooperation 
makes sense for China and the Central Asian state’s national interests and for the 
international energy market. First, both China and the Central Asian countries are 
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undergoing a period of economic transition and their ambitious goals require them to 
interact in the global marketplace.  Second, geographic factors are conducive for 
economic trade and development between them.  Third, their economic structures are 
complementary.  Finally, by developing other energy transport infrastructures, they can 
offer a “second Eurasian bridge” and pipelines to bring the oil wealth of Central Asia to 
those that require it.266  While quaint in presentation, the last two items should be left 
open for interpretation.  The Chinese and Central Asian economic structures are far from 
complementary and demonstrate wishful thinking on the part of the Chinese.  The Central 
Asian states remain attached to the Soviet- legacy economic system and infrastructure.  
This is part of the reason why some Chinese firms find it hard to do business in Central 
Asia when the barter system remains a staple of daily local business commerce and cross-
border trading.  Additionally, a “second Eurasian bridge” seems far from how Russia 
coins the term.  Russia under its Eurasianist orientation seeks to be a bridge between the 
East and West.  One should question if Chinese sincerely advocate a similar approach to 
the Russians or if they plan to have as much of the Central Asian hydrocarbons running 
downhill directly in Xinjiang and the rest of China.  The 2005 move by the SCO, 
expanding its membership to include Iran, India and Pakistan as observers, creates new 
possibilities to build other energy pipelines that can potentially crisscross the expanse of 
Eurasia. 
1. Separatism and Economic Development in Xinjiang: The Door to 
Central Asia 
Islamism and Separatism in Central Asia and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) in China’s Northwest posses a threat to Chinese domestic security, but 
the Xinjiang province also has military and economic value to the Chinese.267  Militarily, 
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Tarim Basin contains large deposits of oil, natural gas and minerals.  The Xinjiang 
province “is also important as a potential pipeline conduit for crude oil from 
Kazakhstan.”268 
Guangcheng Xing, the Deputy Director of the Institute of East European, Russian 
and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, contends 
“[e]conomic development is a central component of China’s approach to fighting 
separatism and maintaining long-term stability in Xinjiang.”269  During the Cold War, 
China’s strategy regarding its Northwest was one of defense.  However, the independence 
of the former Soviet republics offered new opportunities.  Throughout the 1990s, the 
XUAR regional government initiated several policies promoting the region’s economic 
development and expanding foreign trade expansion; including building joint trade 
centers with foreign partners thereby attracting foreign businesses to further tie local 
firms to outside companies.  Building Xinjiang’s infrastructure and establishing a 
favorable business climate has allowed XUAR to become the main corridor for trade with 
the independent Central Asian states.  This is major strategic adjustment in Chinese 
domestic and foreign policies regarding Xinjiang. Shifting from a defense orientation 
toward an economic development door into Central Asia marked “an important change in 
the attitude of [the] Chinese Communist party and the Government.”270 
Xinjiang is also important to China’s future energy security.  According to the 
official China Daily, the Xinjiang region is set to replace China’s Daqing oilfield in its 
Northeast as the primary source for the production of Chinese domestic energy 
requirements.  Currently Xinjiang is China’s third largest oil producing region, holding 
30 percent of Chinese oil reserves and 34 percent of its natural gas reserves.  Chinese 
officials expected oil production in Xinjiang to double from 22 million tons produced in 
2004 to 50 million tons in the near future.  Domestic production in Xinjiang, matched  
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with imports from Central Asia, is expected to increase to over 100 million tons annually, 
which is the equivalent of nearly 60 percent of China’s total domestic production from 
2004.271 
2. Economic and Energy Relations  
The break-up of the Soviet Union provided China with new opportunities and 
challenges in reestablishing its historical “silk road” economic and cultural ties with 
Central Asia.272  Through SCO and bilateral arrangements, China can offer the Central 
Asian states lessons drawn from China’s own transition toward a market economy; 
further ensuring the likelihood of greater successes and prospects of common economic 
prosperity in reviving the new “silk road” economy. 273  China recognizes the economic 
potential of the Central Asian Republics’ oil and gas reserves to the world economy.  The 
SCO offers China key tie- ins to Central Asia.  China needs to develop its customer 
goods, but more importantly it needs to secure its access to the Central Asian energy 
resource sector. 
In 1993 China became a net importer of oil and increasingly reliant on energy 
imports.  By 2003, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second- largest petroleum 
consumer behind the U.S., with an estimated 5.56 million barrels consumed per day.  
China’s 2003 oil production was only 3.54 million barrels per day, which required net oil 
imports of 2.02 million barrels per day (bbl/d). According to the U.S. Department of 
Energy, China is estimated to have 18.3 billion barrels of proven oil reserves.  Chinese oil  
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demand is projected to reach 12.8 million bbl/d by 2025; with net imports quadrupling to 
over 9.4 million bbl/d.274  The rising demand for oil has led China to consider all 
resources of oil throughout Southeast Asia and Central Asia. 
During the 1990s, Chinese diplomatic officials and business leaders were 
crisscrossing Central Asia, signing bilateral cooperation agreements and business 
contracts aimed at expanding Beijing’s regional footprint.  Trade and energy cooperation 
between China and Central Asia largely came about after Li Peng’s trip to Kazakhstan in 
1994.  While the Chinese economy is flourishing, its domestic oil and mining industries 
have not been able to keep pace with the demands of its growing economy.  Chinese 
interests in Central Asia are largely driven by its need for energy resources.  Nineteen 
ninety-eight marked an important year for establishing a new energy relationship with 
Kazakhstan.  China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) secured the rights to own 
and operate the Uzen oilfield in western Kazakhstan.  Additionally, China also contracted 
to open up the Zhanazhol, Kenjiyake and Wujing oil fields in Aktyubinsk near the 
Kazakh border with Russia. 275 
The SCO has opened up new opportunities for China to pursue oil deals with 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.  Robert Ebel, Director of the energy and national 
security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington,  
argues, “China’s involvement in Central Asia is prompted both by higher demand and its 
need to reduce the risk of relaying on the Middle East.” 276  However, not all has gone 
according to plan.  China’s “go West” policy has renewed the drive behind Chinese state 
companies’ revival of energy investment projects throughout Central Asia.  Specifically, 
Beijing has sought a revival in energy cooperation with Kazakhstan, which had 
“languished since 1997, when CNPC promised to invest $9.5 billion in pipelines and oil 
fields thousands of kilometers from home.”277  Russia derailed this effort by suggesting a 
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Siberian-based pipeline for China’s energy needs.  However, this Russian proposed 
project gradually succumbed to Russia’s own Russia-first strategy.  This is an indicator of 
the limits of Sino-Russian economic cooperation.  Russia wants to control as much of the 
energy pipelines as possible, especially the natural gas infrastructure, for its own gains.  
In essence, Russia’s energy policy is more collaborative than cooperative demonstrating 
the short-tern nature of arrangements with other countries, especially China.  When 
Russia began toying with the idea of developing a different transit route for Siberian 
energy resources to the Pacific Rim, which would provide additional customers (e.g. 
Japan and Korea), China recognized the limits of Russian-promised energy negotiations 
and sought its own path.  Thus, China has renewed its bilateral engagement with 
Kazakhstan, which is attributable to Russian President Putin’s failure to deliver on a 
“2001 pledge to build an oil pipeline from eastern Siberia to China’s petroleum capital of 
Daqing.”278 
China’s main target for securing access to Central Asian oil has been Kazakhstan.  
As of 2004, “Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country that exports oil to China. 
Kazakh oil shipments to China, which are sent by rail, account for less than 1 percent of 
China’s imports.”279  However, these exports may increase given Chinese efforts to 
secure a 1,000-kilometer pipeline from Kazakhstan’s central Karaganda region to China’s 
northwestern Xinjiang region by the end of 2005.280  Additionally, China plans to extend 
the Karaganda pipeline further west toward Kazakhstan’s Kenqiyaq oil field, in the 
Aqtobe region, on the Caspian Sea.281  In total, Beijing has invested about $1.3 billion so 
far, employing more than 12,000 Kazakh workers on Chinese-run projects throughout 
Kazakhstan. 282 
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CNPC acquired a 60 percent stake in the Kazakh oil firm Aktobemunaigaz, which 
included a pledge to invest significantly in the company’s future development over the 
next twenty years.  Prior to the 2000 SCO meeting in Tashkent, the Kazakh and Chinese 
governments’ inked the most significant deal to date. The joint venture called “for the 
construction of a $700-million pipeline to export Kazakh crude oil into western China. 
The pipeline would run from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, supplying three 
refineries with about 200,000 bbl/d of crude oil.”283  Already there are purported to be 
300,000 Chinese working on the pipeline in Kazakhstan, probably in an effort to reduce 
the unemployment caused by the privatization of the Chinese State Owned 
Enterprises.284  China is also active in creating partnerships with Uzbekistan.  China 
recently “offered to help Uzbekistan develop its small oil fields in the Ferghana 
Valley.”285  Additionally, China is committing foreign direct investments286 in other 
Central Asian energy resource projects (e.g. hydroelectric) in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. 287  
China’s foreign policy dealings within the SCO seemed to be on the track of using 
individual sidebar agreements to strike energy deals, thereby increasing its influence 
within the SCO.  This was reflected during the Tashkent meeting when “China provided 
other [SCO] member states with $900 million in preferential export and buyer’s 
credits.”288  This supports the argument that China is seeking to use the SCO to harness 
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the enormous economic potential of the Central Asian Republics to secure its 
preeminence in the region.  Furthermore, this also demonstrates the power causal variable 
in regime formation and maintenance. 
3. The Outlook: Does China view the SCO as an International Economic 
Regime? 
China’s economic agenda in the SCO and its energy interests in Central Asia are 
straightforward.  Chinese business activities in Central Asia have been modest to date 
largely due to the legacy economic system and infrastructure within the former Soviet 
republics.  Chinese business ventures associated with the development of XUAR have 
opened a gateway into Central Asia; however, there is still reluctance on the part of 
Chinese to sink financial resources into large regional multiparty projects.  Instead, China 
has used the multilateral framework of the SCO to acquire and operate energy concerns 
throughout Central Asia. 
Beijing’s choice to operate bilaterally could demonstrate China’s desire for 
pursuing a regional hegemonic policy over access to energy resources and energy transit 
routes outside of the SCO framework.  This would put China in direct competition with 
Russia, Iran and India. In this case, if China’s interest in the SCO is best described as an 
international economic regime, then Chinese policy actions should be characterized in 
either one of two ways.  The SCO is an egoistical self- interested regime where China is 
not constrained from pursuing separate energy policies from the other members.  Another 
potential characterization of China’s dealings within the SCO as a regime, is based on 
political power.  This approach would consider Chinese business activities as not 
promoting collective gains, but instead the SCO reflecting China’s political power for 
enhancing its own economic growth through compulsory strategies to limit the choices of 
the Central Asian states. 
However, when the SCO added Iran, India and Pakistan as observers in 2005, a 
dramatic change might have occurred in how the Chinese envisioned the future of the 
SCO as an international economic regime.  This would indicate that in the future, the 
purpose of the SCO lies beyond a talk shop on energy pipeline routes, and thus, the 
Chinese recognize a collaborative effort is needed to pool resources in a long-term 
economic strategy.  The neoliberalism approach would cite these actions as evidence of 
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growing economic interdependence because “states can no longer solve a number of 
issues through unilateral action alone.  Common problems demand a pooling of resources 
and even the creation of regimes to facilitate cooperation.”289 
E. CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA 
In the past, China has not seen the Central Asian states’ pursuit of security 
agreements with other states as a threat to their security (e.g. multilaterally within the CIS 
framework or bilaterally with NATO’s Partnership for Peace).290  China recognizes that 
in order to maintain the stability and security in Central Asia, it would have to play a 
more active role with its new neighbors.  The SCO is the vehicle for promoting Chinese 
security interests in Central Asia, by establishing institutional arrangements such as 
RATS, which also supports its domestic security interests in Xinjiang.  This long-term 
view supports a shared common interest with like-minded conservative Central Asian 
political elites.  However, the question remains as to whether the Chinese view such 
arrangements as providing for “collective security” or just facilitating its interests in 
Central Asia. 
Omnibalancing would expect to see both external and domestic threats driving 
alignment choices for maintaining the status quo of the weak Central Asian regimes, and 
thus, the need for the SCO.  China’s choice to highlight the internal nature of the threat 
from the “three forces” and foregoing bilateral security agreements with individual SCO 
members in its security strategy in Central Asia supports the view that China could 
potentially see the SCO as a concert.  However, if the main Chinese perception of threat 
becomes external in nature (e.g. NATO Eastward expansion and the continued U.S. 
military presence in SCO member states) then one should reexamine the SCO as an 
alliance instead of a concert. 
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1. Islamism and Separatism in Central Asia and Xinjiang 
Some have commented that while China’s quest for natural resources shapes 
China’s Central Asia policy, it does not accurately reflect the entire motivations behind 
China’s interests.  Niklas Swanstrom, Executive Director of the Program for 
Contemporary Silk Road Studies at Sweden’s Uppsala University, agrees that the 
Chinese are interested in Central Asia’s natural resources: 
They do want oil and gas because China is in desperate need of these as its 
economy grows. But it goes deeper than that. They want to secure the 
borders. They want to make sure that Central Asia is a stable region. 
Because if Central Asia runs into military conflicts, it is likely to spread 
over to Xinjiang, China’s westernmost province. And that would be a 
problem for the Chinese government. So part of this is to create stability in 
the Central Asia region because stability in Central Asia means stability 
for China. And also, it’s in the Chinese interest to develop these markets, 
to create the infrastructure in Central Asia.291 
China has been able to tap into the Central Asian authoritarian regimes’ concerns about 
the rise in Islamic militancy.  Areas for cooperation include “intelligence exchanges, 
police cooperation, training of police, training of military forces, and the design of 
military operations targeting terrorist activities.”292  
The key to China’s security concerns is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) in northwestern China.  This poorly developed area comprises one-sixth of 
China’s territory and borders Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Russia and Tajikistan.  The population of XUAR is approximately 16.6 million 
with its largest minority consisting of 7 million Uighurs, who are ethnic Turks and 
Muslims.  XUAR also has demographic similarities with Central Asia, since the region 
also is home to 1 million Kazakhs and smaller amounts of Kyrgyz and Tajiks.  The 
potent ial for ethnic unrest, political Islam and ideas of promoting separatism within the 
large minority communities makes Xinjiang a top priority in Chinese domestic security 
calculations.293 
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The Chinese have always considered Xinjiang an inseparable part of its territory 
and the fight against separatism in this region has a long history dating back as early as 
the 1930s with the spread of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism.294  Between 1998 and 
1999, China began to use the SCO as a platform for increased cooperation to contain their 
separatist threat by tying it to larger regional instability issues within Central Asia.  The 
1998 SCO Almaty conference marked China’s first expression of interests in developing 
a deeper partnership beyond political ties, including creating a new security environment.  
SCO members were deeply concerned over the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.  
China was able to leverage its concerns of the activities of dissident elements in Xinjiang 
from bases in Central Asia to form a joint SCO policy toward terrorists, extremists and 
separatists. Additionally, China sought to link counterterrorism efforts in South East Asia 
with those of the SCO to establish a security environment for their regional economic 
interests.  However, this has little traction within the organization because other SCO 
members were interested in talks concerning revival of the “silk road” economy and 
cooperation in trade and investment, especially in the oil and natural gas sectors of the 
Central Asian economies.  In 1999, when extremist elements penetrated into Kyrgyzstan 
from neighboring Afghanistan, China jumped at the chance to stress the urgency of the 
situation.  At the 1999 SCO meeting in Bishkek, China’s security issues came to the 
forefront of the SCO’s agenda.  China called for the crackdown on the forces of religious 
extremism and ethnic separatism, as well as international terrorist activities to which 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all agreed was the primary threat facing 
the SCO members. 
2. The Outlook: is SCO the Key to Securing Xinjiang? 
For China, the SCO not only serves an important role in its geostrategic policy 
calculations but also as a mechanism for promoting its economic development.  However, 
China must first confront the complex security situation in Xinjiang and Central Asia, 
namely the activities of the “three forces”—terrorism, separatism and extremism—which 
the Chinese consider ferocious and rampant.295  Those that take a pessimistic view of 
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China’s interest in Central Asia and the SCO contend that China has shielded itself within 
the SCO’s framework to combat charges of human rights abuses in the Xinjiang 
province.  General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People’s 
Liberation Army, describes the security situation in Central Asia as “ferocious” and rife 
with the “three forces” of terrorism, extremism and separatism.  In the future, he sees the 
SCO establishing consultant and emergency mechanisms for dealing with unexpected 
crises.  Regional antiterrorist organizations and joint antiterrorist exercises are key 
mechanisms for cracking down on the “three forces” eradicating “drug smuggling, arms 
proliferation, and other criminal activities.”296 
China’s behavior in executing its security interests in Xinjiang and Central Asia 
are neatly packaged within the SCO framework.  The Chinese government’s insistence 
that the SCO is not an alliance against any other state made the previous analysis a 
worthy case for exploring the omnibalancing approach with respect to domestic and 
international threat perceptions.  Omnibalancing like balance of threat theory tells us that 
states pursue temporary alignment strategies.  China’s efforts in establishing and 
promoting the SCO RATS indicate that they are interested in long-term solutions for 
regional problems.  However, the institutionalization of a security mechanism does not 
necessarily equate to full-scale collaboration on regional security issues.  Instead, one 
should question whether the SCO RATS reflects an actual hardening of the SCO 
institutional itself.  In this case, international regime theory would argue that the 
interaction of the SCO members reflects more coordination than cooperation, and thus, 
characterize the SCO as a regime for resolving dilemmas of common aversion (e.g. 
preventing outcomes, like regime change in the Central Asian states). 
F. ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE INTERESTS 
China’s foreign policy and economic security in Central Asia will be shaped by 
its ability to adapt with flexibility and creativity in the post-Taliban environment.  China 
will seek to expand its influence within the SCO to promote a multilateral regionalist 
approach.  This approach can be defined as open-ended, rather than in narrowly defined 
security needs of the SCO member states.  Thus, China has a la rge stake in seeking a 
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long-term guarantee for ensuring its access to the energy resources of Central Asia.  But 
in this effort they are mindful of Russian historical ties, although they increasingly point 
to their two millennia cultural linkage with Central Asia.  China views the U.S. military 
presence in Central Asia as a constraint on its foreign policy, either within the SCO or 
bilaterally with each state.  Chinese fears and suspicions of an American. presence in 
Central Asia range from encirclement to a destabilizing force. 
China’s new Central Asian posture is measured along four tracks.  First, China 
has begun participating in regional organizations such as the SCO and ASEAN.297  
Second, by establishing the SCO, China has created a new strategic partnership with 
Russia and the Central Asian states through deepening bilateral and multilateral 
economic and security ties.  Third, the SCO has allowed China to expand its regional 
economic agenda through increased access to the region’s natural resources, mainly 
through bilateral agreements, in a space once considered Russia’s backyard.  Finally, the 
SCO offers China a mechanism to reduce the distrust and anxiety over state-to-state 
security concerns, while establishing a forum for addressing non-traditional threats.  The 
weight of evidence in the overall assessment of China’s interest in Central Asia indicates 
the economic variable is of primary importance in its foreign policy.  This would likely 
indicate that China views the SCO as more of an international economic regime rather 
than a defensive alliance or a “concert” system 
Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia also has strengths and weaknesses.  China 
has been successful at cultivating new economic and security relationships within the 
SCO, but limitations and constraints remain on the level of cooperation going forward.  
Economically, Premier Wen’s portrayal of China as a “friendly elephant” interested only 
in win-win commercial ties with its neighbors has met with some skepticism.  Michael 
Vatikiotis contends that some Asian nations worry that an elephant, no matter how 
friendly, will still leave trampled grass in its path. 298  The specter of “creeping 
sinocization” has created a “latent fear, especially in the countries bordering China, that 
Beijing is hungry for land. And if that is the case, even a small immigration of Chinese to 
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the region would swamp the local populations.”299  Such fears have circulated within 
Kyrgyzstan’s populace as well as within the Russian political elite, questioning China’s 
long-term motivations in Central Asia and the Russian Far East. 
While Beijing has denied any aspirations of a land grab in Central Asia, others 
look to China’s historical record of past actions.  Murat Auezov, the former Kazakh 
ambassador to China was less than diplomatic when expressing his concerns over China’s 
growing influence in Central Asia.  He said: 
I know Chinese culture. We should not believe anything the Chinese 
politicians say … As a historian; I’m telling you that 19th-century China, 
20th-century China and 21st-century China are three different Chinas. But 
what unites them is a desire to expand their territories.300 
This observation underscores that while the Central Asian states are attracted to China’s 
economic miracle of achieving rapid modernization without sacrificing political control, 
Chinese motivations may turn questionable in the future.301  Martha Brill Olcott sums up 
these lingering concerns as follows: 
At the same time, though, the Central Asians fear any appeal the Chinese 
make in the spirit of “kinship,” since the region’s precolonial [sic] history 
is punctuated by invasions from the East.  Help given in the name of 
ethnic Asian solidarity is attractive only if it carries no accompanying 
threat of conquest or neo- imperialist control. 302 
Swanstrom counters this assertion of a looming Chinese threat to Central Asia by taking a 
more optimistic view.  He argues that while Russia continues to enjoy a decisive cultural 
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and economic advantage in Central Asia, the key to breaking Russia’s monopoly may lie  
with the Central Asian states: 
It doesn’t necessarily have to be a zero-sum game, but from the Central 
Asian states, there’s also interest in decreasing the Russian influence and 
to have Chinese influence -- maybe even Indian influence and American 
influence and European influence … They have realized over the years 
that it’s not good to have one dominant power in the region. They don’t 
want it to be the Chinese or the Russians. They’re trying to diversify the 
influence over the region, and they are very conscious about the fact that 
neither the Russians nor the Chinese would be the perfect actor to 
dominate the region. 303 
This also underscores the point that the SCO in its totality should not be considered a 
defensive alliance aimed at the U.S.  The Central Asian states while economically and 
militarily weaker than Russia and China do have independent choices to make at every 
juncture of the SCO’s development.  The SCO has yet to constrain any of these states 
from acting independently, at least bilaterally with the U.S.304 
The “Shanghai Spirit” associated with the SCO is described as a partnership and 
not an alliance.  The cooperation among SCO members as equals and the setting up of the 
SCO RATS and Secretariat, a hardening of the institutional framework, is indicative of 
international regime behavior.  However, this partnership may well speak to coordination 
instead.  This would produce a regime for resolving dilemmas of common aversion.  But 
in light of the fact that the Chinese have sought to regulate state behavior of the member 
states by establishing a formal institutional arrangement lends more to the SCO being a 
regime created to solve dilemmas of common interests, particularly in the security arena 
through the establishment of RATS.  The economic agenda of the SCO as a regime has 
yet to fully develop, as evidenced by both Russia and China pursuing bilateral economic 
arrangements with each other and the Central Asian republics.  If the SCO is an 
international economic regime then any changes to the regime should be examined 
through an analysis of the egoistic self- interest and political power casual variables to 
determine if the underlining principles for the SCO’s creation have changed.  
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China is very bullish on the prospects for the SCO.  China’s economic prowess 
and ability to infuse large amounts of capital into the Central Asian economies has given 
it the leading role in the development of the SCO at Russia’s expense.  China’s ability to 
offer short-term economic gains to the Central Asian states has forced Russian President 
Putin to rethink economic privatization in Russia.  To combat China’s growing economic 
instrument of power, Putin has had to rein in and harness the post-communist privatized 
“commanding height” industries.  Putin has been forced to use the state apparatus as the 
mechanism to ensure political influence and economic access to Central Asia resources, 
especially oil and gas.  A potential Chinese economic juggernaut will force Russia to 
design its own bilateral relationship with the Central Asian Republics, while China bathes 
in the role of dictating the direction and policies of the SCO. 
107 
VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE SCO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. NOT A NEW “GREAT GAME” 
At this time, one cannot presently classify the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) as either a paper tiger or a regional powerhouse, because the current status and its 
future potential rests somewhere in the middle.  Instead, the SCO resembles a mixture of 
an international regime and a concert.  In 2001 Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to avert common threats from revisionist regimes in Central 
Asia, to demilitarize the borders of its members, and achieve long-term economic growth 
through increased cooperation between the countries, formed the SCO.  The inclusion of 
India, Pakistan and Iran in 2005 renewed speculation over a new “Great Game” in 
Central Asia.  While this notion is superficially attractive, a deeper analysis was needed 
in order to determine what is driving Russian and Chinese interests in Central Asia. In 
particular, the SCO suggests that Russian and Chinese geopolitical and geoeconomic 
interests and strategic implications are important, but knowing their importance does not 
provide sufficient insight into how the two countries define these interests.305   
By examining how Russia and China view their interests in Central Asia, this 
thesis has provided a comprehensive assessment of Russian and Chinese interests in the 
SCO.  The results were contradictory.  For Russia, its interests in the SCO are driven by 
its identity.  Central to that identity, Russia is both a great power and the Eurasian bridge 
between the East and West.  In this light, Russia’s interest in the SCO should be 
considered only as a means for them to try once again of achieving great power status.  
China’s interests on the other hand are material.  China’s participation in the SCO is 
driven by its energy concerns with a long-term goal of achieving economic security.   
However, a U.S. presence in Central Asia has complicated both Russia’s and China’s 
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pursuit of these interests, while the regional events of 2005 have further added to the 
complexities of the security, stability and developmental situation for the Central Asian 
regimes.  In theoretical terms, which were developed in Chapter Two, this suggests that 
Russia and China see the SCO as a means to avert common problems and a way for them 
to pursue common interests.  On balance, the evidence suggests that the SCO’s future is 
leaning toward a concert, but if both states’ achieve economic interdependence in the 
region and bilaterally become more significant, it might evolve into a regime. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE SCO 
Neorealists, using balance of threat and omnibalancing theories, can make the 
case that the SCO is a temporary coalition (e.g. alliance or concert) based on perceptions 
of threat from internal and external actors.  Neoliberalism can make the case that the SCO 
represents an effort to institutionalize longer-term cooperation in order to solve dilemmas 
of common interests.  Evidence presented in this thesis supports both schools’ 
assumptions about the SCO and Russian and Chinese behavior.  However, social 
constructivism suggests that Russia’s and China’s identities shape how they perceive 
their interests in Central Asia, thus what is driving their interests and their primary 
motivations toward the SCO.  Because these identities are different, Russia and China 
have different motivations for building the SCO.  These differences suggest that over 
time the security portfolio of the SCO may collapse, while economic cooperation may 
persist. 
1. Anti-U.S. Alliance 
Originally, the SCO was formed to avert common threats from revisionist regimes 
in Central Asia, to demilitarize the borders of its members, and achieve long-term 
economic growth through increased cooperation between the countries.   These issues 
remain valid today.  However, some have speculated that China and Russia have larger 
plans for the modern SCO.  In particular, “to counter U.S. policies of economic 
penetration of the oil-rich Caspian Basin and to facilitate a global balance of power 
through a multi-polar order that would frustrate U.S. hegemonic goals.”306 
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The joint Sino-Russian exercise “Peace Mission 2005” raises fresh concerns of 
the SCO becoming a defensive alliance against the U.S.  While this exercise was not 
under the guise of the SCO, the new SCO observers sent representatives.  Some suggest 
that Russia and China are flexing their muscles showing they are capable of assuming a 
larger security role in Central Asia and the Pacific Rim.  Others contend that it is an 
opportunity for Russia to sell arms for cash that its country needs, while the Chinese can 
get training and sensitive technologies from Russia, activities pursued with the aim of 
balancing the U.S. influence in the region. 307 
2. SCO as a Reflection of Collective Identities 
The SCO does not reflect a collective identity interest by each of its members.  
Each state has different reactions to regional and international events.  Over its history, 
the Central Asian SCO members have supported U.S. foreign policy actions, despite 
hesitation or suspicion of these actions from Moscow or Beijing.  Individual states have 
chosen to pursue bilateral relations with the U.S. in opposition to SCO summit rhetoric, 
which demonstrates a lack of a group consciousness.  Thus, the SCO should not be 
considered as an identity driven interest, collective security community or an example of 
the development of a collective regional identity. 
3. The SCO as an International Regime  
All SCO member states recognize the importance of regional cooperation and 
interdependence in meeting the challenges of regional security, long-term economic 
cooperation and increased cultural ties.  Today, the SCO members show some 
characteristics of economic and security interdependence, however, this does not mean 
the SCO presently reflects an international economic regime despite the hardening of its  
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institutional framework.  The most tangible economic results of these meetings have been 
the bilateral economic arrangements worked out between the countries in side bar, state-
to-state meetings. 
Both Russia and China look at Central Asia and the multilateralism of the SCO as 
bright spots in their foreign policies.  However, economically the SCO represents a 
contradiction.  For all the talk about regional stability, security and development, the 
SCO, as an international economic regime, has been inefficient at pooling resources.  
Discussions for creating a Central Asia Development Bank are just that.  The Central 
Asian states, as well as Russia and China do not have the capital currently to conduct 
such an enterprise.  Other international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development continue to provide funds for 
Central Asian regional projects.308  Russia and China are very adaptive and resourceful 
countries, however taking on such an effort based on Western models might prove to be 
too problematic to execute in the short run through the SCO.  Thus, bilateral relations 
among the member states will continue to be the primary means of interaction on 
cooperative issues, while the SCO’s multilateralism should be viewed as coordination. 
Neoliberals expect that the reduction in transactions costs, uncertainty and 
increased ability for issue linkage that arise from the establishment of an international 
regime will generate a sustained demand for the continuance of the regime, so long as the 
long-term net gains of participating in the regime are greater than the short-term net gains 
of not participating.  In other words, neoliberals believe that institutionalized cooperation 
is self-reinforcing because the existence of international regimes increases the gains from 
cooperation and decreases the costs of doing so. If there is no common interest in 
cooperating in the first place then you will not get a regime.  The neorealist critique of 
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to last as long as Russian and Chinese interests continue to overlap.  Promoting regional 
security against the “three evils”—terrorism, separatism, and extremism—has been the 
primary motivation for all SCO members in the short-term.309 
Both countries see a common ave rsion problem in the three evils.  But they do not 
agree on whether a genuine “collective security regime” is required. This is what one 
would expect from coordination problems: regimes are not necessary because, a more 
informal means of coordinating policies are available.  The real question that all of this 
raises is whether China sees security issues as a coordination problem or a cooperation 
problem.  If this is fact the case, as suggested, then the prospects for the SCO’s longevity 
diminish, as Russia and China are not even in agreement on how to define the situation. 
Empirically, this lends support to the concert idea, where the SCO is a temporary ad hoc 
alliance against internal threats. 
4. A Concert: Intervention in Central Asia 
Russian, Chinese and Central Asian leaders have declared at the SCO summit 
meetings that they are facing similar threats to the status quo from the “Three Evils”—
terrorism, separatism, and extremism—generated by militant Islamic radical forces.310  
The argument for viewing the SCO as a “concert” rests on whether internal stability is the 
glue holding the SCO together.  The merit of this approach is that it enables analysts to 
assess the durability of such a basis for cooperation.  However, the SCO members 
emphasis on cooperation against common threats may be little more than agreements 
based upon a coordination games rather than collaboration games., in which each 
member may place limits on the extent to which a state would allow or request aid to 
combat its perceived threats to its domestic environment or conditions. 
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From the concert view, the SCO should persist so long as the powers involved 
share a perception of a common threat. This differs from Walt only in that the threat in 
the concert view is not external, but internal, in the form of domestic groups—whatever 
their transnational support network, be it democracy activists or the “three evils”— that 
seek to overthrow the government.  Thus, the SCO should not be considered a collective 
security regime, but merely an ad hoc alliance against internal threats.  If Russia and 
China continue to disagree on how to deal with those threats, the SCO will fall apart, or 
cease to have any security portfolio. 
The first test of the concept of the SCO as a “concert” system which demonstrates 
that security crises are handled through coordination rather than cooperation was how the 
SCO and its members reacted to the ouster of the Akayev regime in Kyrgyzstan in Spring 
2005.311  As the crises unfolded, the SCO RATS principals met in an unscheduled 
meeting in Tashkent on March 30, 2005.  The members’ inability to reach a consensus or 
plan of action demonstrated the limits of security cooperation within the SCO, especially 
between Russia and China.312 
Russia and China held opposite positions on whether or not to use the SCO during 
the Akayev regime ouster.  According to one source, the Chinese prepared for military 
intervention in Kyrgyzstan with the justification of protecting its citizens living in 
Bishkek.313  Chinese President Hu Jintao is alleged to have demanded a resolution 
allowing the SCO to act as the mechanism for establishing military order in Bishkek.  At 
the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing directly contacted his foreign 
minister counterparts requesting an emergency session of the SCO.314  Russia instead 
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“showed a cautious stance toward China’s moves against a former Soviet Union country.  
It is said the emergency meeting was never held, and the Chinese military's intervention 
was never realized.”315 
If the purported Chinese plan is true, then Russian hesitancy in allowing Chinese 
military intervention shows the limits of the SCO’s security arrangement and the narrow 
degree to which Russia and China share any common interests; either in ends or in 
means.  Russian identity as the true security manger of Central Asia states would have 
been on the line.  Especially on the heels of international accusations of meddling in the 
post-election outcomes in Georgia and Ukraine, the Kremlin leadership was reluctant to 
get involved in the elections of a sovereign state, especially with such a strong OSCE and 
NATO presence in the region. Based on this interpretation of events, the SCO is not 
collective security regime but merely an ad hoc alliance against internal threats and that if 
Russia and China continue to disagree on what means to use to deal  with those threats, 
the SCO will fall apart, or cease to have any security portfolio. 
The pace at which the Akayev regime was overthrown appears to have taken the 
SCO members off guard.  One might speculate on how Russia or China might react to a 
similar situation in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.  However, it might also depend upon 
whether the authoritarian regimes in Astana and Tashkent are willing to seek relief from 
Moscow and Beijing—moves that would further expose the limits of their shaky power 
base.  A similar situation in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan in the future might produce a 
different outcome, and an intervention response for Russia and potentially China, but not 
necessarily in a cooperative effort. 
5. 2005 and Beyond 
Today, the economic benefits and interdependence associated with reviving the 
new “silk road” economy has prospects for success.  However, the stability of the SCO 
and frictions lay elsewhere.  The true test and potential limits for the SCO and its 
members will be how well they understand and uphold their declared respect for state  
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sovereignty and borders as well as the conditions under which military intervention is 
appropriate, if needed.  This demonstrates that the SCO seems at present more like a 
concert, and that this concert may not last given the lack of mutual understanding. 
C. FUTURE U.S. AND THE SCO RELATIONS 
The future scope of U.S. interactions with the SCO and U.S. bilateral relations 
with SCO member states lay in five areas.  First, Central Asia now has three uniquely 
different multilateral organizations operating under the guise of security: NATO with its 
Partnership for Peace program, CIS CSTO, and the SCO RATS.  The current security 
situation and atmosphere in Central Asia, as well as Afghanistan remains volatile.  
Regional political, security and economic crises can quickly and easily be upset by 
perceived threats emanating either internally or externally to the region.  In the future, the 
task is to identify areas in which these three multilateral organizations relations will 
produce cooperation, competition, or conflict. 
Second, and closely linked with the first, is how the U.S. force structure and use 
of Central Asian infrastructure plays out.  While Russia and China may seek a more 
active posture for the SCO as part of the regional security framework, the question 
remains as to how the Central Asian states view the U.S. presence.  After 9/11, the U.S. 
military presence was clearly seen as a symbol of anti-terrorism cooperation and to some 
extent protecting the status quo leadership and governance of Central Asia.  However, 
after the events in Andijon, one might argue that the U.S. is now seen as a symbol of 
color revolutions and as a revisionist upsetting the delicate status quo.  These perceptions 
of U.S. foreign policy will influence how Russia, China, and the Central Asian states 
react to crises and will determine the likelihood of cooperation, competition, and conflict. 
Third, U.S. policy makers should consider what rules or frameworks exist for 
intervention in the event of another colored revolution, regime change, or other regional 
security or economic crisis.  Here the signals are important.  The SCO members were 
completely taken aback by the pace of events in Kyrgyzstan.  Neither China nor Russia 
intervened.  The question of why has been speculated on but has not been answered yet.  
The 2005 SCO summit communiqué indicated that the military presence of one SCO 
state in another SCO country should be worked out within the CIS CSTO or SCO RATS.  
115 
This provides both Russia and China a vehicle to intervene in Central Asia, except that 
China is subject to a Russian veto in the SCO RATS, but not the other way around if 
Russia chooses to use the CIS CSTO.  Key areas to monitor are whether Russia and 
China, as well as the CIS CSTO and SCO RATS characterize the threat, as either 
internally or externally based.  Russian and Chinese political elites, military officers and 
scholars have characterized the threat of the “Three Evils”—international terrorism, 
religious extremism, and separatism—as being externally based originating from the 
Middle East through Afghanistan.  Thus, the stated position of Russia and China in 
promoting a multi-polar world and an insistence of non- interference in the domestic 
affairs of a sovereign state might be quickly left out of foreign policy choices.  After the 
ouster of President Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, some have argued that the “Tulip” revolution 
was not a colored revolution at all, but simple regime change.  Moscow’s reaction to this 
event can be characterized in three ways.  First, they were unprepared and ill equipped to 
act as a rapid reaction force.  Second, the Kremlin was gun shy in the aftermath of the 
2005 Ukrainian presidential election results.  Finally, Moscow may not have even 
considered the event as a regime change at all, but instead accepted of the outcome as 
new Kyrgyz leadership which they could easily work with and maintain the business as 
usual status quo. 
The leadership in the Kremlin has a great wealth of recent Russian experience 
with political crises and intervention in sovereign states dating back to the Cold War.  
The trend in this history seems to be less military intervention as a rule.  China, although 
it did have economic ties in Kyrgyzstan, also restrained itself from intervention in the 
Akayev political crisis.  However, future events may pose a new set of calculations and 
expected reactions, especially if similar situations were to occur in Kazakhstan or 
Uzbekistan. 316  Islamic militant groups such as the IMU and HT are the main perceived 
threats to regime stability by Uzbekistan, Russia, and China.  Moscow may proceed 
cautiously in its approach.  The Kremlin’s desire to have Tashkent beholden to it and its 
ability to leverage assistance based on this concession might prove to be a reason why 
Russian political and military leadership would opt to intervene based on the CIS CSTO, 
                                                 
316 In Uzbekistan’s case, while not a member of the CIS CSTO, it may be only able to turn to Russia 
for help.   
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while keeping the Chinese and the SCO RATS out of play.  Kazakhstan is a more 
problematic case for both Russia and China.  Russia has described its “Southern Tier” 
with Kazakhstan as separate from the rest of Central Asia.  This is a key distinction, 
because the large number of Russian minorities living in Northern Kazakhstan mattered 
considerably during the policy debates during the 1990s.  Any threat to the stability of the 
Kazakh regime would threaten Russia’s core “Eurasianist” identity and political and 
economic security.  Chinese economic interests, large infrastructure investments, and the 
large number of Chinese in the country also make direct Chinese military intervention 
more likely.  Any regime crisis in Kazakhstan has the potential for creating a chaotic 
situation that would test the limits of Sino-Russian cooperation, produce competition and 
even conflict resolution.  Such a scenario might be the ultimate test of whether the SCO 
is an international regime when the two driving factors behind regional cooperation 
between Russia and China collide. 
Fourth, the SCO identifies itself is a regional organization among bordering 
states.  It is only natural to see the SCO reaching out to its neighbors in South Asia and 
elsewhere for supporting its long-term goals of producing cooperation and reducing 
sources of tension and competition.  There are not any guarantees that the addition of the 
new observer states constitutes an SCO enlargement.  The countries granted observer 
status in 2005 reflect the maintenance of long standing strategic partnerships, whether 
Russia with India and Iran or China with Pakistan.  Nevertheless, the addition of two 
nuclear powers with a third with nuclear aspirations does bear watching and further 
analysis. 
Finally, based on the foregoing analysis the U.S. should not view Sino-Russian 
cooperation in the SCO as a defensive alliance against the U.S.  The U.S. should engage 
the SCO whenever possible.  There are many areas for cooperation, such as counter 
terrorism, promoting stability and security for regional development, and counter 
proliferation efforts.  The U.S. does not need to join the SCO as a full-time member.  
Instead, the U.S. should seek a partnership status, similar to that of NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace.  In such a scenario, the U.S. might press to be a SCO partner for regional 
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